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Preface 
The United Kingdom’s GOV.UK Verify service offers a unique model for proving one’s 
identity online. As a country with no national ID or other universally held common 
identifier, its identity verification process rests on a risk- and standards-based approach that 
allows identities to be verified to different levels of assurance, as required for accessing a 
given service or transaction. Unlike most other identification systems where the government 
acts as the identity provider, verifier, and user, here the identity verification process is carried 
out by accredited private sector entities who collect “identity evidence” by checking user 
data against a diverse set of publicly and privately held records. Though Verify’s 
implementation is still in early stages, its unique, federated approach to digital identity 
verification, its operational standards, as well as its closely embedded privacy principles can 
offer many lessons for governments as well as private entities seeking to provide online 
access to services and transactions. 
The UK’s enduring concerns for preserving privacy are evident from all aspects of Verify’s 
design. Identity-verifying companies do not know which government service the user has 
requested access to, nor can the government service providers tell which private entity has 
verified their user’s identity. Another remarkable feature of the UK’s system is its use of 
levels of identity assurance instead of a single “gold-standard” identity required to access 
government services online. The identity assurance framework and the standards developed 
for determining what forms of identity evidence satisfy each level of identity assurance 
provide valuable guidance for other countries and can be easily adapted to different contexts. 
Verify’s risk–based approach to identity verification can be particularly useful where no 
single, national ID exists, but it also points to the value of supplementing official 
identification with other “dynamic” evidence of identity. While it may not provide first–stage 
“foundational” identification—still a priority for many developing countries—it offers 
insights that will become more valuable with the spread of digital societies and economies. 
Alan Gelb 
Senior Fellow 
Center for Global Development 
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For Janet Hughes, programme director of GOV.UK Verify between 2013 and 2016, who 
encouraged her team to “be bold.” 
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Disclaimer 
Although this report draws on information obtained from Edgar’s close working 
relationship with Verify, all inferences and assessments are his own and should not be taken 
as inferring or implying anything regarding official UK government policy for Verify and its 
associated services. This report has benefited from suggestions by the GDS team. These 
should not be taken as an endorsement of the document or confirmation of its accuracy but 
were provided in the spirit of supporting transparency in GOV.UK Verify operations. 
How to Read this Report 
This report consists of six main sections. Section A provides an overview of GOV.UK 
Verify, including details of how it operates and a summary of the socio–political context that 
resulted in its distinctive approach. The next three sections provide more detailed 
descriptions of how Verify works (section B), how it was built and operates (section C), and 
its governance arrangements (section D). Each of these detailed sections can be read in 
isolation from the others. Section E outlines the next steps for Verify now that it is a live 
service, including future applications and critiques of the approach it adopts. Nevertheless, 
evaluating the broader politics and pragmatics of delivering digital government in the UK is 
beyond the scope of this report. Section F reflects on the lessons that can be learned from 
Verify in relation to the World Bank principles on identification for sustainable development 
as the design choices that underpin the Verify model can provide a useful template against 
which current and future identity practices can be contrasted. For example, reflecting on the 
innovations that arise from Verify’s use of multiple identity providers may provide trigger 
innovative improvements in the customer experience even when the government acts as the 
sole identity provider. Appendices provide a glossary of key terms and abbreviations as well 
as a more detailed historical background to Verify.  
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A. Overview 
Introducing GOV.UK Verify 
GOV.UK Verify is a way to prove who you are online in the United Kingdom, providing a 
safe, simple and fast access to government services like submitting a tax return or checking 
driving licence information (GOV.UK Verify 2018a, 2016a).  
At the time of finalising this report (July 2018—a real–time list of available services is 
available at (GOV.UK Verify 2018b)), individuals can use Verify to: 
• check your income tax (HM Revenue & Customs) 
• check your state pension (Department for Work and Pensions, HM Revenue & 
Customs) 
• claim a tax refund (HM Revenue & Customs) 
• claim for redundancy payment (Insolvency Service) 
• disclosure and barring service (Home Office) 
• get your state pension (Department for Work and Pensions) 
• help your friends or family with their tax (HM Revenue & Customs) 
• PAYE for employees: Company car (HM Revenue & Customs) 
• personal tax account (HM Revenue & Customs) 
• renew your short-term medical driving licence (DVLA) 
• report a medical condition that affects your driving (DVLA) 
• rural payments (DEFRA) 
• self-assessment tax return (HM Revenue & Customs) 
• sign your mortgage deed (HM Land Registry) 
• Universal Credit Digital Service (Department for Work and Pensions) 
• vehicle operator licensing (DVSA) 
• view or share your driving licence information (DVLA) 
A range of further central government services are currently in progress for becoming live 
services. Discovery work is also being undertaken with local authorities to integrate Verify 
into local authority service provision (GOV.UK Verify 2016b). Additionally, there are a 
number of industry (private sector) projects at various stages of development and the 
intention is that the identity infrastructure behind Verify will enable private sector as well as 
public sector use. 
As a fully operational system Verify has four key features that have resulted in a distinctive 
identification system. Whilst not all of these features are immediately replicable in other 
contexts, both individually and collectively they offer key exemplars that can influence the 
provision of identity related services globally. The key features of Verify (the “Verify 
model”) are: 
• risk- and standards-based approach to identity verification and authentication; 
• federated architecture involving multiple identity providers that encourages 
innovation in both verification and authentication activities; 
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• privacy–by–design approach that embeds privacy principles in contracts, 
memoranda of understanding and norms and includes expert oversight of privacy 
and consumer issues; 
• user focussed service delivery approach that includes an emphasis on transparency 
and engagement with all relevant stakeholders and diverse users. 
Typical Verify User Journeys 
As Verify offers a relatively novel approach to digital identity practices, the best way to 
understand it is to follow two typical user journeys that provide a useful illustration of how 
Verify operates in practice. The first journey involves a user creating a Verify’d identity in 
order to access an online government service. The second involves the same user re–using 
their previously created Verify’d identity to access another online government service. 
User Journey 1: Creating a Verify’d Identity to Access Online Government Services 
In this user journey, a user intends to access an online government service such as 
submitting their tax return online. In 2016 89 percent of self–assessment returns were 
completed online (BBC News 2016). Having found the self–assessment page 
(https://www.gov.uk/log-in-file-self-assessment-tax-return) on the GOV.UK website, the 
user is invited to sign in (see figure 1).1 There are two ways to sign in, via GOV.UK Verify 
or via the Government Gateway (which is due to be decommissioned in 2018 (Hall 2016)). 
Creating a Verify’d identity can normally be done in 10–15 minutes (GOV.UK Verify 
2018a). In contrast, the final stage of setting up and using a Government Gateway account 
typically involves a secure activation code that needs to be sent to the user in the post. As a 
result, the process of setting up a Government Gateway account can take up to seven days. 
This can be problematic for citizens as there are penalties of up to £100 for late submission 
of tax returns (Whitley 2015). 
                                                     
1 Screenshots are based on a user journey undertaken in late June 2016. The whole journey is reviewed regularly 
alongside being used for A/B testing, so wording, fonts, branding and steps are subject to change. 
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Figure 1. GOV.UK Verify: Start of a user journey 
 
A user who chooses to use Verify then states whether this is their first time using Verify or if 
they have used the service before, see figure 2 as there is no obvious way to check whether a 
particular individual has used the service previously. This also means that a user can create a 
new Verify’d identity with a different identity provider by following the “first time using 
Verify” option.  
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Figure 2. GOV.UK Verify: New and existing users 
 
First-time users are then told about the Verify service and the certified companies who will 
verify their identity. This also informs them that the companies meet government security 
standards and that there is no charge to use the service, see figure 3. 
Figure 3. GOV.UK Verify: Introducing the certified companies 
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Next, users are (currently) asked a few questions that will help determine which of the 
certified companies will best be able to undertake the identity verification checks on them. 
The companies can draw on different data sets for identity verification and offer different 
technical solutions (e.g., apps) for identity verification and authentication. For example, not 
all the companies may be able to use identity documents issued by countries other than the 
UK, whilst some can do the identity checks for UK nationals who only have some 
“standard” documents, see figure 4. Some allow for verification and authentication using 
user installed apps, see figure 5. 
Figure 4. GOV.UK Verify: What identity documents are to hand? 
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Figure 5. GOV.UK Verify: What technologies are to hand? 
 
Based on the answers to these and other pre–selection questions, the user is presented with a 
list of certified companies that are “likely” to be able to verify their identities, see figure 6. In 
some circumstances, for example, a potential user with no UK address, it will not be possible 
to obtain a Verify’d identity and the user will be advised to contact the relevant service 
directly. In other cases, the user answers might result in a warning that they may not be able 
have their identity verified and would need to contact the relevant service directly but also 
giving them the option nevertheless to try using Verify.  
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Figure 6. GOV.UK Verify: Choose a company 
 
Choosing one of these companies, for example Experian, takes the user to an account 
creation page with the certified company, see figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Experian: Account creation 
 
This creates an account with the certified company and next the user provides basic details 
that are used to start the verification process, figure 8. As noted above, these screenshots, 
used with permission, were taken from the process as at late June 2016. The whole journey is 
reviewed regularly so wording, fonts, branding, and steps are subject to change. 
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Figure 8. Experian: Basic details collection 
 
Experian also ask for address details and then begins the identity verification process based 
on the data entered by the user as well as data that they have access to. Identity verification 
normally involves further checks, for example, against government issued documents such as 
passports and driving licences, see figure 9. 
16 
Figure 9. Experian: Document checks 
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Figure 10. Experian: Proving it’s you 
 
Entering driving licence details allows them to be checked with the Driver and Vehicle 
Licencing Agency (DVLA) in terms of a “confirmation that the details match.” Whilst those 
details are being checked, Experian allows the user to provide further information to “prove 
it’s you.” The range of additional information types that can be provided is given in figure 
10. Choosing the identity test option will result in “knowledge-based” questions being asked, 
such as asking who has provided the user with a credit card and what the recent closing 
balance on that account was, see figure 11. Not all identity providers offer the option of 
knowledge-based questions and draw on other methods of identity verification instead. 
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Figure 11. Experian: Financial data identity test 
 
A final step in the Experian process is setting up account security, see figure 12. 
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Figure 12. Experian: Account security 
 
Once a suitable form of account security has been set up (in this case, setting up a secure 
PIN using the M–Pin app), Experian confirms that the identity has been verified and the 
account can now be used to sign in to the requested online service, see figure 13. 
Figure 13. Experian: Verification complete 
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At this point, the user is in the (in this case) HMRC system and can complete their tax self–
assessment. 
User Journey 2: Using an Existing Verify’d Account to Access Online Government 
Services 
Creating a Verify’d account only needs to be done once. The next time the user wants to 
work on their tax return, they indicate, at the step illustrated in figure 2, that they have used 
Verify before. They are then asked which company they have their account with, see figure 
14. 
Figure 14. GOV.UK Verify: Reusing an existing identity account 
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Choosing Experian, returns the user to the Experian account sign in. Then, following the 
appropriate account security check (i.e., authentication using M–Pin), the user is immediately 
redirected to the requested online government service. 
Figure 15 presents these data flows diagrammatically, starting with the user connecting to the 
Government service provider (1), being redirected to Verify (2) where they are asked to 
either pick a certified company to obtain a Verify’d identity from or to choose a certified 
company they already have a Verify’d identity account with (3, 4). The user is then redirected 
to the certified company (5) and there either undertakes the identity proofing and 
verification checks (6, 7) or authenticates themselves (6, 7). Once this is done, the user is 
returned to Verify (8) and, from there, on to the Government service provider (9) and 
thereafter the Government service provider interacts directly with the user (10). 
Figure 15. Data flows in Verify 
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Understanding the Socio–political Context of Verify 
Although there is an ongoing academic debate about the extent to which human values may 
shape the technical design of systems and architectures (Winner 1980; Woolgar and Cooper 
1999), the socio–political context around the scrapping of the previous identity cards scheme 
resulted in the development of the Verify model. A fuller description of this historical 
context is available in Appendix 2: Historical background to Verify. 
In particular, Verify emerged as a replacement identity infrastructure following the scrapping 
of the previous government’s controversial scheme for biometric identity cards based 
around a centralised National Identity Register (Whitley 2014). Politically, the coalition 
government of 2010 eschewed any notion of a centralised identity database or anything that 
might be seen as a proxy National Identity Register.  
The Verify model brought together a number of existing themes. The first of these was the 
focus on citizen, rather than government, needs that had been highlighted by the report 
written by Sir James Crosby (2008). 
This user–centric thinking developed alongside work by CESG (now the National Cyber 
Security Centre (NCSC)), the Information Security Arm of GCHQ (NCSC 2018), who 
issued a two-part report on the requirements for the secure delivery of online public services 
(RSDOPS). This guidance, now officially released as Good Practice Guide (GPG) 43 
(GOV.UK 2012), takes a transactional viewpoint “as a way of describing and reasoning 
about information risk. This approach takes account of the overall business function and its 
distributed service model.” It is concerned with “ensuring security of a transaction end to 
end and therefore takes account of not just technical security aspects but additionally the 
need to ensure security of the business processes and sometimes, complex stakeholder 
relationships that support the provision of an online service.” 
The third key factor relates to privacy concerns that were mentioned by Crosby and 
RSDOPS and were a major factor in the political decision to scrap the identity cards scheme. 
Finally, responsibility for the development of the alternative identity policy for the UK was 
removed from the Identity and Passport Service (a division of the Home Office (interior 
ministry)) and brought to the Cabinet Office, the central department responsible for 
coordinating the delivery of government objectives. In particular, responsibility for identity 
policy was located within the Government Digital Services (GDS), formed in April 2011 to 
deliver the Government’s “digital by default” strategy. 
The Crosby Report and a Focus on User Needs 
In 2006, Sir James Crosby was appointed by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon 
Brown, to lead a “public private forum on identity” (Brown 2006). His report was issued on 
6 March 2008 (Sir James Crosby 2008), alongside the six–monthly report on the likely costs 
of the identity cards scheme (the so-called section 37 reports). 
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In his report, Crosby chose to differentiate between identity management which “is designed to 
benefit the holder of the information” and identity assurance, which “is focused on bringing 
benefits to the consumer,” arguing that the distinction between the two is “fundamental” 
(2008, para. 1.6). “As a result,” he continued, “although the technology employed to achieve 
[identity] assurance and management may be similar, the end design of the system is likely to 
be very different. An [identity] assurance scheme built primarily to deliver high levels of 
assurance for consumers will address issues, such as the amount and type of data stored and 
the degree to which this information is shared, differently to one inspired mainly by the 
needs of its owners” (2008, para. 1.7). 
Before it was rebranded as GOV.UK Verify, identity policy development within GDS 
adopted Crosby’s preferred nomenclature and was known as the Identity Assurance 
programme. 
RSDOPS and a Risk–Based Transactional Perspective 
CESG’s RSDOPS guidance presents a six stage process that “that allows public Service 
Providers to better understand what is needed from a security perspective to support 
delivery of an online service” (GOV.UK 2012, para. 14). The outputs from the process are 
intended “to open a discussion on the security problem and to develop a shared 
understanding of its implications” and “will assist Information Risk Owners in reaching an 
understanding of the information risk implications of their business decisions and satisfy 
themselves that the security response is proportionate and fairly represents the concerns and 
expectations of the business and the customers for the service” (2012, paras. 17–18). 
As part of the risk–based and transactional perspective, the guidance indicates that there are 
different (levels of) requirements for personal registration (“the act of establishing the 
identity of an individual as a condition for issuing credentials that can be used subsequently 
to reaffirm that identity”) including a base level where “the real identity of the individual is 
not relevant to the service,” through increasing levels of assurance: “asserted,” “tested,” and 
“verified.” At this top level, “the user claims a real identity and the claimed identity is subject 
to rigorous testing to independently verify the individual’s identity and presence. The 
independent evidence of identity might be cited in support of criminal proceedings” (2012, 
p. 25). 
This graduated approach provides an alternative perspective to the “gold standard of 
identity” approach found in the previous identity cards scheme and led to the development 
of Good Practice Guide 45 on identity proofing and verification (GOV.UK 2018a) that 
explicitly introduces levels of assurance. 
A key feature of GPG 45 is its formalisation of levels of assurance. In the first instance, a 
Verify’d identity is one which has been verified to Level of Assurance 2 (LoA2) although 
there are plans to extend the service by offering identities that have only been verified to 
LoA1 as well (GOV.UK Verify 2017a). 
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Identity Assurance Principles and the Privacy and Consumer Advisory Group 
In order to properly address the privacy and consumer concerns around identity assurance 
identified by Sir James Crosby, in 2011 the Cabinet Office created the Privacy and Consumer 
Advisory Group (PCAG) (GOV.UK Verify 2017b) which held its first meeting on 2 August 
2011. According to its terms of reference (GOV.UK Verify 2015a), “PCAG is a forum that 
provides an independent view on issues involving privacy and wider consumer concerns” on 
a “variety of initiatives with implications for individuals regarding the use of their personal 
data and their privacy.” These range from “the identity assurance programme to the use of 
patient records in the NHS, to interdepartmental data sharing and anti–fraud initiatives” 
(GOV.UK Verify 2015a). Membership of the group includes academics, privacy advocates, 
consumer groups and others with specialist expertise in the area. It meets monthly and the 
minutes of its meeting are published by GDS (GOV.UK Verify 2017b). Alongside regular 
engagement with the programme, it developed the “Identity Assurance principles” 
(GOV.UK Verify 2014a). 
A first draft of these Identity Assurance principles was issued for public consultation and 
feedback in April 2012 and beta released in June 2013. These set out, in detail, how 
GOV.UK Verify could be configured to meet the privacy and consumer expectations of its 
users. A second version of the document was released in September 2014 incorporating 
feedback received during a consultation on the beta version published in June 2013 
(GOV.UK Verify 2014a). 
GDS and the Delivery of Government Digital Services 
Verify is a part of GDS and GDS is itself part of the Cabinet Office and the Efficiency and 
Reform Group. It is responsible for the delivery of Government as a platform (Brown et al. 
2017), an approach that will “deliver cross–government programmes that will improve 
public services and deliver efficiencies including. . . the development of the GOV.UK Verify 
programme to enable individuals to prove their identity online and to access government 
services securely and safely” (GOV.UK 2015a, para. 11.20), see also (GOV.UK 2017a; GDS 
2017a; GOV.UK 2017b). 
GDS is creating “a set of shared components, service designs, platforms, data and hosting, 
that every government service can use. This frees up teams to spend their time designing 
user–centric services rather than starting from scratch, so services become easier to create 
and cheaper to run” (GOV.UK 2018b). 
GDS has created a digital service standard (GDS 2018a) which includes 18 criteria to help 
government create and run good digital services. Important criteria for Verify include “1) 
Understand user needs,” “2) Do ongoing user research,” “4) Use agile methods,” and “5) 
Iterate and improve frequently.” As such, the development approach runs counter to more 
traditional “waterfall models” of systems development which are sequential and non–
iterative. Waterfall models have, arguably, been the cause of widespread system failures in 
UK Government IT (Institute for Government 2011; Public Administration Select 
Committee 2011). 
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One consequence of the digital service standard is that all GDS projects, including Verify, 
pass through a series of phases: Discovery, Alpha and Beta before becoming live services 
that provide a “fully resilient service to all end users” and meet “all security and performance 
standards” (GDS 2018b). 
B. How Verify Works 
Verify’s Approach to Identity Proofing and Verification 
Verify is not intended to provide a “gold standard of identification” that relies on a definitive 
register of personal data, rather it operates in a context that includes a number of different 
levels of assurance (GOV.UK 2018a). The current approach is based on four levels of 
assurance in the identity proofing and verification process. Each level provides an increasing 
level of confidence that the applicant’s claimed identity is their real identity (2018a, chap. 2). 
Currently, Government services that use Verify operate at Level of Assurance 2 although 
there are plans to extend Verify to services that operate at Level of Assurance 1 (GOV.UK 
Verify 2017a). 
Level of Assurance (LoA) 1 Identity: “At Level 1 there is no requirement for the identity 
of the Applicant to be proven. The Applicant has provided an Identifier that can be used to 
confirm an individual as the Applicant. The Identifier has been checked to ensure that it is in 
the possession and/or control of the Applicant.” 
LoA2 Identity: “A Level 2 Identity is a Claimed Identity with evidence that supports the 
real-world existence and activity of that identity. The steps taken to determine that the 
identity relates to a real person and that the Applicant is owner of that identity might be 
offered in support of civil proceedings.” 
LoA3 Identity: “A Level 3 Identity is a Claimed Identity with evidence that supports the 
real-world existence and activity of that identity and physically identifies the person to whom 
the identity belongs. The steps taken to determine that the identity relates to a real person 
and that the Applicant is owner of that identity might be offered in support of criminal 
proceedings.” 
LoA4 Identity: “A Level 4 Identity is a Level 3 Identity that is required to provide further 
evidence and is subjected to additional and specific processes, including the use of 
biometrics, to further protect the identity from impersonation or fabrication. This is 
intended for those persons who may be in a position of trust or situations where 
compromise could represent a danger to life.” 
The identity proofing process “should enable a legitimate individual to prove their identity in 
a straightforward manner whilst creating significant barriers to those trying to claim to be 
somebody they are not.” The individual presents evidence to support their identity claims 
and the evidence shall be confirmed as being “Valid and/or Genuine and belonging to the 
individual.” This includes checking whether the identity exists in the real world and, 
importantly, the “breadth and depth of evidence and checking required shall differ 
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depending on the level of assurance needed in that the identity is real and belongs to the 
individual.” 
In particular, this means that the identity proofing process does not rely on possession of a 
single breeder document, such as a birth certificate or passport (Berghel 2006; Collings 
2008). Instead, the individual provides access to an “identity evidence package” (2018a, chap. 
3) that includes evidence that can be categorised into three broad categories: Citizen, Money 
and Living (GOV.UK Verify 2014b). Consideration of the identity evidence package will 
normally include reviewing the activity history of the evidence (i.e., existence in the real 
world over a period of time) and active counter–fraud checks to ensure it is not a known 
fraudulent identity. 
There are five different headings for evaluating and scoring different kinds of identity 
evidence (2018a, chap. 5), see table 1. 
Table 1. Identity proofing and verification elements and scores 
 Score 
Element 0 1 2 3 4 
A Strength of identity evidence      
B Outcome of attempts to validate the identity evidence      
C Outcome of the identity verification      
D Outcome of active counter–fraud checks      
E Strength of activity history evidence      
 
Element A is consideration of the strength of the identity evidence. A score of 1 is given if 
the issuing source performed no identity checking itself, but the issuing process can be 
reasonably assumed to have been delivered into the possession of an individual and the 
evidence contains at least one unique reference number or contains a 
photograph/image/biometric of the person to whom it relates. 
A score of 3 is given if the identity evidence confirmed the applicant’s identity in a manner 
that complies with the identity checking requirements that satisfy Money Laundering 
regulations. The highest score (4) is awarded when the issuing source for the identity 
evidence visually identified the applicant and performed further checks to confirm the 
existence of that identity. 
Element B is the outcome of attempts to validate the identity evidence. A score of 0 means 
that the validation attempt was unsuccessful, a score of 1 means that all personal details from 
the identity evidence have been confirmed as valid by comparison with information 
held/published by the issuing/authoritative source. A score of 2 requires both the personal 
details and identity evidence to be confirmed as valid, or the issued identity evidence has 
been confirmed as genuine by trained personnel using their skill and appropriate equipment 
and who confirmed the integrity of the physical security features or the issued identity 
evidence has been confirmed as genuine by confirmation of the integrity of the 
27 
cryptographic security features. A score of 3 is given if the personal details and identity 
evidence are confirmed by the source and the integrity of credential is confirmed whilst a 
score of 4 tightens the requirements further. 
Element C relates to the outcome of the identity verification. A score of 0 means that it was 
not possible to confirm that the applicant is the owner of the claimed identity, a score of 1 
means the applicant has been confirmed as having access to the identity evidence provided 
to support the claimed identity. A level 2 score can be achieved by static or dynamic 
“knowledge-based verification” or physical or biometric comparison to the strongest piece 
of identity evidence provided whilst higher scores place further restrictions on this process. 
Element D relates to active counter–fraud checks. Here a score of 0 indicates that the 
applicant is suspected of being, or known to be, fraudulent. A score of 1 indicates an 
absence of evidence that the identifier is being used for fraudulent activity. Higher scores 
move from reliable independent sources confirming no fraudulent activity to using sources 
private to the Government to check that there is no evidence that the applicant is fraudulent. 
It is helpful to note that whilst there are strong operational reasons for allowing known 
fraudulent identities to be created, so that they can be tracked through the system and thus 
result in criminal prosecutions and intelligence about the weaknesses in government systems, 
the Verify identity proofing and verification process explicitly only provides verified 
identities that are not known to be fraudulent, thus closing down this particular avenue of 
anti–fraud activity. 
Element E relates to the activity history of the claimed identity. Here a score of 0 means 
that it was not possible to demonstrate the required activity history, a score of 1 means that 
it was not necessary to demonstrate the required activity history, a score of 2 relates to 
activity of at least 180 days (6 months), a score of 3 relates to an activity history of 405 days 
(just over a year) and a score of 4 for a claimed identity with an activity history of at least 
1080 days (3 years). 
In order to satisfy the current requirements for a Verify’d identity (i.e., one that meets 
LoA2), the identity evidence package must contain (2018a, chap. 6): 
Identity Evidence that as a minimum meets one of following profiles: 1 
piece of identity evidence with a score of 3 and 1 piece of identity evidence 
with a score of 2 (known as an identity evidence profile of 3:2) or 3 pieces 
of identity evidence with a score of 2 (known as an identity evidence profile 
of 2:2:2). Each piece of identity evidence must be validated with a process 
that is able to achieve a score that matches the identity evidence profile; i.e. 
where the profile is 3:2 the validation processes must be able to also achieve 
scores of 3:2 respectively. Additionally, as a minimum the applicant must be 
verified as being the owner of the claimed identity by a process that is able 
to achieve a score of 2 for verification. In terms of counter–fraud checks 
the claimed identity must be subjected to a counter–fraud check by a 
process that is able to achieve a score of 2 as a minimum. Finally, as a 
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minimum, the activity event package must be able to achieve a score of 2 
for the activity history of the claimed identity (GOV.UK 2018a, chap. 6). 
 
GPG 45 also gives examples of various forms of identity evidence, their associated levels 
(Element A) and which aspect (Citizen, Money, Living) they correspond to (the full 
illustrative list is available in 2018a, chap. Annex A): 
Table 2. Examples of various forms of identity evidence 
Identity Evidence Level Citizen Money Living 
Fixed line telephone account 1   X 
Police bail sheet 1 X   
Firearm certificate 2 X  X 
HMG issued Statelessness person 
document 
2 X  X 
Unsecured personal loan account 2  X X 
An education certificate from a well-
recognised higher education 
institution 
2   X 
Mobile telephone contract account 2  X X 
Passports that comply with ICAO 
9303 (Machine Readable Travel 
Documents) 
3 X   
Bank savings account 3  X  
Mortgage account 3  X X 
Non–bank credit account (including 
credit/store/charge cards) 
3  X  
EEA/EU full driving licences that 
comply with European Directive 
2006/126/EC 
3 X  X 
Biometric passports that comply with 
ICAO 9303 (e–passports) and 
implement basic or enhanced access 
control (e.g., 
UK/EEA/EU/US/AU/NZ/CN) 
4 X   
EEA/EU government-issued identity 
cards that comply with Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 that 
contain a biometric 
4 X   
UK Biometric Residence Permit 
(BRP)  
4 X   
NHS staff card containing a biometric 4   X 
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The Guide also provides illustrative examples of activity events (2018a, chap. Annex E). 
Table 3. Illustrative examples of activity events 
Citizen Money Living 
Electoral roll entry Repayments on an unsecured 
personal loan account 
(excluding pay day loans) 
Land registry entry 
 Repayments and transactions 
on a non–bank credit account 
(credit card) 
National pupil database entry 
 Debits and credits on a retail 
bank/credit union/building 
society current account 
Post on internet/social media 
site 
 Repayments on a student loan 
account 
Repayments on a secured loan 
account 
 Repayments and transactions 
on a bank credit account (credit 
card) 
Repayments on a mortgage 
account 
 Debits and credits on a savings 
account 
Repayments on a gas account 
 Repayments on a buy to let 
mortgage account 
Repayments on an electricity 
account 
 
Identity proofing and verification does not end once an identity has been Verify’d. Instead, 
there is a requirement for periodic checks after the registration has taken place as well as 
checks “every time a user signs into a service” (GOV.UK Verify 2014b). These checks 
include things like repeating the counter–fraud check periodically or ensuring that 
verification of an address is not older than a set number of days. 
Identity Proofing and Verification in Practice 
The kind of identity proofing and verification model used in Verify is a natural consequence 
of the RSDOPS inspired risk–based approach to identity claims and standards. The Verify 
implementation, however, has the additional distinguishing feature in that the government 
does not act as an identity provider undertaking the identity proofing and verification 
activities. Instead, it only acts as a service provider (relying party) that relies on Verify’d 
identities. 
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Figure 16. The traditional checking model when government acts as the identity 
provider 
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Figure 17. Identity checking in Verify 
 
Figure 16 and figure 17 illustrate the conceptual difference between existing models of 
identity checking and the Verify model. The existing government as identity provider 
approach increasingly already relies on a mix of public data sets and private sector data sets 
(Lips et al. 2009; Lips 2013). In the Verify model, the certified companies are able to use the 
Document Checking Service to confirm the Driving Licence and Passport information 
provided by the user (GOV.UK Verify 2014). The checking service allows the certified 
companies to check user data against a subset of the data held about individuals by the 
government. The certified companies are also able to bring in novel data sources for identity 
proofing and verification purposes. 
Certified Identity Providers 
The role of identity providers is undertaken by a range of commercial (private sector) 
organisations. At the time of writing, seven companies are certified identity providers 
providing services for Verify. That is, they both successfully participated in the framework 
agreement procurement exercise and completed the accreditation and onboarding process to 
become live identity providers and continued to satisfy the requirements: 
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• Barclays 
• CitizenSafe 
• Digidentity 
• Experian 
• Post Office 
• Royal Mail 
• SecureIdentity 
The governance processes for these private companies offering services to government are 
discussed below, but as they need to implement identity proofing and verification to the 
level of assurance required by government service providers (i.e., currently LoA2), the Verify 
team has issued an “operations manual” that provides guidance on how the identity 
providers should implement the identity proofing and verification activities (GOV.UK 
Verify 2014c). This public version of the report is redacted due to operational security 
requirements. 
Identity Proofing and Verification (IPV) Operations Manual 
The guidance includes details of how to check whether physical identity evidence (e.g., a 
passport) is genuine and identifies both the kinds of physical equipment needed to check 
them (e.g., ultraviolet light to highlight features of key passport pages (HM Passport Office 
2011)) as well as the kinds of training required to test the genuineness of these documents to 
the different standards of evidence described above. It also includes details of the identifier 
formats for common identifiers, such as driving licence numbers, bank card numbers etc. to 
provide basic, “checksum” type checks to ensure the identifiers are valid numbers. 
Amongst the counter–fraud capabilities discussed in the guide are checking whether the 
claimed identity has been subject to identity theft regardless of whether it was successful or 
not, checking whether the claimed identity is deceased and checking whether the address 
history of the claimed identity is consistent with the declaration by the customer. 
Matching the identity evidence package against information held by external data aggregators 
(including credit reference agencies) includes guidance on how to match against known 
synonyms, such as Bill and William as well as variations in how addresses are stored. 
It is important to recognise that “simply because the identity provider has discovered a 
contra indicator that is associated with a fraud identifier does not in itself imply that there is 
an actual fraud only that there is a risk of fraud. In order to determine that there are 
reasonable grounds to suspect that a fraud may be taking place the fraud identifier shall need 
to be confirmed by following the mitigating actions associated with the contra indicator. 
Where the identity provider does not have the capability to perform the mitigating action 
then they cannot apply the ‘pass’ score and by definition the fraud identifier cannot be 
‘confirmed’” (2014c, paras. 108–109). 
A key goal for Verify is to maximise its demographic coverage (i.e., the proportion of the 
UK population who can verify their identity using GOV.UK Verify). Gaps in the coverage 
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can lead to high profile failures that cause embarrassment for the service and, more 
importantly, frustration from service users who are unable to access important government 
services online and are key technical delivery priorities (GOV.UK Verify 2016c). Verify’s 
attempts to understand and improve demographic coverage are discussed in more detail 
below. 
Perhaps the highest profile example of a gap in demographic coverage arose in November 
2014 where many farmers were unable to register for the Department of Food and Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA) Common Agricultural Policy information service (Fiveash 2014). With 
hindsight, it is understandable that this community, who are infrequent international 
travellers and who may eschew mortgages and other forms of debt, had many problems 
verifying their identity using the identity evidence packages available at that time. It has been 
suggested that one form of possible identity evidence that is held by many farmers is a 
firearms certificate (listed in GPG 45 as level 2 identity evidence for citizen and living 
categories). Unfortunately, information about who holds a firearms certificate is not available 
in a checkable register and so none of the available identity providers would be able to 
perform identity checks against that particular identity source. 
Innovation in Identity Verification 
One of the benefits of using private sector identity providers operating in a competitive 
marketplace is that there is a strong incentive for the identity providers to offer as wide a 
range of possible identity checking services as possible as they are paid on the basis of 
successful enrolments (e.g., Merrett 2016a). For example, young people, particularly those 
aged 16–24, are less likely to have an established identity footprint that could be used as part 
of the identity evidence package (GOV.UK Verify 2015b) and, importantly, would have 
limited activity history associated with any evidence they did possess (even their mobile 
phone contracts would often have been taken out by their parents) (GOV.UK Verify 
2016d). 
An Open Identity eXchange UK (OIXUK) discovery project with the JustGiving website, 
however, identifies a number of areas where alternative data sources could be used to 
support a claimed identity to LoA2 (OIXUK 2016a). According to the OIXUK report, 
JustGiving is a tech–for–good company that facilitates donations and fundraising for 
charities. In 2001, JustGiving launched as the first UK online fundraising platform and has 
grown to include a database of users which covers 89 percent of UK postcodes. This 
translates to over 6 million active users in the previous 12 months (2015). Importantly, each 
user that transacts has achieved a certain standard of verification, with a proportion 
achieving a greater degree of verification. JustGiving transactions can be used in the 
knowledge-based verification stage by asking the individual which was the last charity they 
supported or who they have supported via the site in an analogous manner to which an 
individual might identify which bank account they most recently opened or which cards they 
have recently used for a particular purchase. Other forms of online history evidence have 
also been explored (GOV.UK Verify 2016e; Veridu 2016) as well as alternative approaches 
to gathering identity evidence including data aggregators using micro sources of data 
(OIXUK 2017a). 
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Alongside this work, other forms “end–point innovation” include the ability to take 
photographs of identity documents (such as passports and driving licences) to enable 
“physical” checks of the document alongside data checks. These photographs are handled 
using secure in–app image processing techniques, rather than using the device’s camera app 
which would store the document image less securely on the device. Additionally, some 
identity providers are able to undertake back–end checks against financial evidence by 
undertaking a £0.00 transaction with an individual’s account (this goes one step beyond the 
kind of nominal transaction (£0.10) introduced by services such as PayPal to confirm 
account ownership). 
Enhancing the user experience is a key driver for some of these innovations and searches for 
alternative means of identity proofing and verification as there is growing evidence 
(particularly in the form of analysis of incomplete initial registration journeys (cf OIXUK 
2017b)) that users do not like knowledge-based verification type questions such as “What 
was the amount of your last month credit card bill?” or “What was the period of your most 
recent mortgage application”? 
It is also important to recognise that although Verify is a digital only service, the 
Government’s Digital by Default strategy includes assisted digital, whereby those service 
users who are unable, for whatever reason, to use digital services can use alternative means 
(including face-to-face and telephone-based services) (GOV.UK Verify 2016f) and using 
support workers to assist people through the Verify user journey (GOV.UK Verify 2017c). 
When stating that the identity proofing process “should enable a legitimate individual to 
prove their identity in a straightforward manner” GPG 45 explicitly does not make any 
assumptions about non–UK nationals obtaining Verify’d identities. Instead, the question 
simply becomes one of whether they have sufficient identity evidence (that can be checked) 
to support a LoA2 identity. Whilst it is reasonable to expect that checking any (UK) state 
issued documents held by UK nationals will be included in the default offering of the 
certified companies, the companies are increasingly able to check evidence from outside the 
UK as well, including passports and other official documents issued by foreign countries 
(GOV.UK Verify 2016d). 
A related concern surrounds the demographic profile of individuals who might find it more 
difficult to provide sufficient identity evidence, such as younger (or older) people, those who 
are unemployed etc. Careful modelling, however, suggests that the problem is primarily one 
of combinations of evidence, perhaps unsurprising given the different kinds of evidence that 
Verify uses. 
Simply relying on coverage of data available in individual data sets is insufficient. For 
example, with 78 percent of adults aged 18 and over having a driving licence and 80 percent 
of England and Wales residents having a passport this does not necessarily mean that 95.6 
percent of people have either a driving licence or a passport as the correlations between 
owning one document and the other are unknown (GOV.UK Verify 2016g). 
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An online tool that allows one to visualise the combination process and explore the 
underlying data is available at Dale (2016) and this data can be supplemented by survey data 
provided by the Office of National Statistics (ONS). This enhanced data set now suggests 
that at least 79 percent of the adult population (rising to 88 percent if they are in 
employment), have enough evidence to successfully verify their identity (GOV.UK Verify 
2016h). This enhanced data set can be explored at Dale (2017). 
More generally, this proactive approach seeks to identify those characteristics that might 
lead, either directly or indirectly, to systemic gaps in identity evidence that might preclude 
certain parts of society from being able to obtain a Verify’d identity. This information can 
then be used by the certified companies to integrate alternative data sources as part of the 
service they offer. 
Automated Identity Checks? 
As Verify offers a digital–only identity service, ideally, many of the basic identity proofing 
and verification checks should be able to be made electronically by the identity provider 
(using real–time access to data sources such as the Document Checking Service via 
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)). In practice, despite the UK’s strong position in 
the open data field, many of the possible data sources are not (yet) available for such 
automated checking via APIs and, instead, manual back office checks need to be undertaken. 
Additionally, the “physical” checks of identity documents (based on photographs) are done 
manually, although again, identity providers are moving to offer such checks on a 24/7 
rather than “office hours” basis. 
Other problems with automated identity checks have arisen in the context of married 
(female) users who have some identity evidence using their married name and others, 
including professional-based information, in their maiden name. In some cases, the split 
between these two different forms of identity evidence mean that it is not possible to 
achieve a sufficient score for a LoA2 Verify’d identity using either name. 
An ongoing challenge for all the data sources used in identity proofing and verification is the 
quality of the underlying data. Thus, for example, if there are data entry errors in the 
database that the identity evidence is being checked against (at one time the DVLA driving 
licence database reported errors in up to 30 percent of all records (BBC News 2005; 
Blackhurst 1993; Whitley 1994)), or if the data is not up–to–date (for example, not notifying 
the organisation of a change of address) the identity proofing and verification will fail. 
One natural consequence being considered is that once an identity has been Verify’d, this 
Verify’d identity could then be used to provide the authorisation to update the checking 
databases with the new identity data, for example with a new, confirmed address. 
Data Minimisation in Identity Proofing and Verification 
A key design choice in the Verify model is that a minimal amount of data is stored as part of 
the identity proofing and verification process. This is considered best practice in both data 
protection and digital identity practice (Nyst et al. 2016). Thus, although a user may provide 
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passport details as part of the initial registration process and this data are used to confirm 
that the passport is genuine, has not been recalled etc., the verification process returns a 
simple Yes/No response. This response, plus the date upon which it was received is stored 
by the identity provider. Additionally, the identity provider is obliged to retain the original 
information provided by the user (e.g., passport number) for audit purposes only. This audit 
requirement is driven by regulatory requirements and the information is needed in case the 
legitimacy of the account activation is questioned in the future. This non–operational, audit–
only data can be stored securely in a separate system. 
Innovation in Identity Authentication 
Identity providers are also innovating in terms of the kinds of authentication services they 
can offer. Alongside the use of one–time–passcodes sent via SMS identity providers are 
introducing apps that can be installed on the user’s smart phone or tablet and thus provide 
an alternative, out of band, authentication method whereby the user authenticates 
themselves via the app (Ashford 2015). Such alternative approaches, provided that they 
satisfy the requirements specified in GPG 44, may address growing concerns about the use, 
for example, of SMS for authentication (Chirgwin 2016; Pauli 2016). 
Innovation around identity authentication can also include privacy–friendly fraud 
monitoring, for example, searching for browser hijacks and man–in–the–middle attacks 
(GOV.UK Verify 2016i). 
Using a Verify’d Identity to Access Government Services 
As indicated in the user journey presented earlier, once an individual has a Verify’d identity 
this can be used to access online government services. As the user journey illustrates, this 
begins with the user seeking to access an online government service, for example, 
completing a self–assessment tax return. Using Verify, users are first redirected to the “Hub” 
and then choose (one of) the identity providers that they have a Verify’d identity with and 
authenticate themselves with that identity provider, see Figure 15. 
The Hub is a key privacy enhancing feature of the Verify model. It acts as an intermediary 
between the identity provider and the service provider and helps ensure that the identity 
provider cannot know which service provider the user is using and hence exploit this 
information for commercial gain (cf Gal 2016; Zuboff 2015). All that the identity provider 
can see is that a user, who has successfully authenticated with the identity provider, is 
accessing a government service. 
Government service providers, in the same way, only receive identity data from the Hub 
and, whilst they can be assured that the identity has been Verify’d to the specified level of 
assurance, they cannot know (or specify) which identity provider has been used. 
The Hub model is not without its own privacy concerns (Brandão et al. 2015) but the Verify 
team is working with one of that report’s authors to address them. In addition, one of the 
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authors of that report has become a member of the Privacy and Consumer Advisory Group 
(GOV.UK Verify 2015c). 
The identity data that passes through the Hub is a small “matching data set” (previously 
known as the minimal data set). It is sent, in encrypted form, from the identity provider to 
the Hub. The Hub then forwards the matching data set (again encrypted) to a matching 
service operated for the government service provider (the relying party). The matching 
service, as its name suggests, matches the matching data set against the records held by the 
service provider, identifying the unique service records associated with the user. Thereafter 
the user interacts directly with the service provider’s systems and their own records. If 
initiating a new service, the matching data can, with the user’s consent, be used to populate 
key fields with the new service (GOV.UK Verify 2017d, sec. 3.3.3.1). 
Thus, if I use Verify to complete a self–assessment tax return with HM Revenue and 
Customs, the matching service uses my associated matching data set to find my tax record 
(and its associated tax reference number). The tax reference number is then used as the 
database key for interactions with the tax system. If I use Verify to check my state pension 
(with the Department of Work and Pensions) the matching service uses my matching data 
set to find my state pension record (and its associated national insurance number). The 
national insurance number is then used as the database key for interactions with the pension 
system. If I use Verify to claim a redundancy payment, I can choose to use the data from the 
matching data set to set up my new account with the insolvency service. 
The matching data set consists of full name, address, date of birth, history of attributes and 
the associated assertion of level of assurance. The matching data set also allows for an 
optional gender field, but identity providers are under no obligation to collect this data and 
the user is under no compulsion to provide it. Rather than offer different matching sets for 
different government services (which would involve the Hub knowing which service was 
being used, a potentially privacy sensitive choice), the same, standard matching data set is 
sent to any government service that is connected to Verify. 
This means that much of the heavy work is undertaken, in fact, by the matching service and 
this is where the history of attributes becomes important. For example, a user may have a 
Verify’d identity based on their new address but be accessing a government service that has 
their old address on file. A simple version of the matching service would therefore report 
that the Verify’d identity could not be matched against the service provider’s records, 
whereas a check against the history of attributes (including earlier addresses) would allow the 
match to take place the user to access the service, perhaps also flagging that an out of date 
address is held by the service provider. 
Paying for Verify 
The financial arrangements around Verify are an important feature of the programme. This 
section covers the three areas of funding, the costing of Verify’d identities and liability issues. 
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Funding 
In November 2015, the Government announced the Spending Review and Autumn 
Statement. This was a four-year plan to fix the public’s finances. Part of the spending review 
included resourcing to cover the cost to government of the Verify service (GOV.UK 2015b). 
This high-profile support for Verify built on the recognition that government needs a secure 
online identity service in order to create digital services around user needs that would allow 
users to securely transfer personal data in real time, reducing or avoiding manual processing 
costs. It was also based on a business case that emphasised that Verify would only require 
users prove their identity once to government, giving a consistent experience for users which 
will reduce failure and waste, provides a consistent level of security across government 
services and a consistent experience for users, rather than creating loopholes and fraud 
opportunities between different departmental approaches to identity assurance. 
It also takes advantage of rapidly developing technology and capabilities in the private sector 
and is more capable of responding effectively to rapidly evolving threats, costs less per 
transaction compared with a single government identity provider or separate solutions for 
each department. Government pays once to verify a user’s identity and then the user can use 
their account to interact with any online government service, so that as more services adopt 
GOV.UK Verify, the cost per transaction decreases (GOV.UK Verify 2015d). Recent press 
reports suggest that the business case predicted £71m of annual cost savings by 2020, with 
running costs of £37m (Glick 2017a). 
The business case also highlighted how Verify was stimulating a new market of competing 
commercial suppliers, reducing price and constantly improving quality through ongoing 
competition, is intended to be scalable beyond central government at low marginal cost as 
well as being usable in the private sector where it can contribute to preventing fraud and 
stimulating innovation and efficiencies in the wider economy. It also noted that Verify is 
supported by privacy campaign groups and consumer experts which increases public trust 
and potential digital uptake. Finally, it noted that Verify enables departments to comply with 
the new European Regulation on electronic identification by 2018, at no additional cost to 
them as, by 2018, government services will have to accept strong identities assured by other 
EU member states (European Commission 2016; GOV.UK Verify 2015d). 
It is important to recognise that “GOV.UK Verify is a piece of enabling infrastructure—it 
will enable departments to transform their services. Departments have already counted the 
value of their transformation plans, albeit that they depend partly on being able to adopt 
GOV.UK Verify. The Verify business case does not attempt to attribute a portion of those 
savings specifically to GOV.UK Verify—departments are responsible for delivering their 
transformation plans and realising the benefits from them” (GOV.UK Verify 2015d). 
An alternative approach that the government could have adopted was to allow the 
development of department–by–department solutions, whereby individual departments 
“could develop solutions tailored to each of their services. Identity verification is a common 
component but there could be competing ways to solve this. In this option departments 
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would invest in building their own solutions which might be uniquely tailored to their 
requirements but across government as a whole will involve duplicating time, effort and 
money.” This is likely to include additional costs due to duplicated software build and 
maintenance costs, reduced government buying power when transacting with commercial 
suppliers and duplicated process costs of identity verification (e.g., if an average user uses 
two services from different departments their identity would have to be verified twice). 
Moreover, the user experience would be sub–optimal as users would have to maintain 
credentials for every department or service that they used. Press reports suggest that the 
GDS business case claimed a saving of £263m by avoiding departments spending money on 
developing their own identity systems and using Verify instead (Glick 2017a). 
The final alternative would be to replace commercial identity providers with a central 
government identity verification service. As noted above, this option has significant political 
costs associated with it. Additionally this approach carries the risk that a single national 
identity provider would become a “honey pot”—single point of failure at a greater security 
risk from attacks and less resilient in the event of failure or attack (Leyden 2016a, 2016b, 
2016c; Thomson 2015). 
According to a 2017 report on digital transformation in government by the National Audit 
Office (NAO 2017) GDS received funding of £455 million in the 2015 Spending Review, 
covering expenditure for the four years from 2016–17. Of the £54 million increase in 
funding between 2015–16 and 2016–17, £43 million (80 percent) is ring–fenced for Verify, 
Government as a Platform and Common Technology Services with Verify taking the largest 
share of this increase. Additionally, the NAO reports that Verify is expected to become self–
funding in 2018-19. This means that two–thirds of the £53 million decrease in GDS’s 
funding between 2017–18 and 2018–19 (£36 million) relates to removal of revenue 
programme funding for Verify (NAO 2017, fig. 3). 
Costs 
Identity providers are paid each time a user successfully creates a Verify’d identity with them. 
The initial framework contracts covered the first 600,000 registrations (GOV.UK Verify 
2014d). The overall cost of payments to certified companies is entirely driven by demand—
they are paid each time they successfully verify an identity at LoA2. They were paid 5 percent 
of their LoA2 during a trial of “basic accounts” in 2015 (GOV.UK Verify 2015e). In order 
to incentivise identity providers to provide a good user experience and demographic 
coverage improvements, there is no payment for failed attempts to verify at LoA2.  
Under the first framework, identity providers were paid the same price as an LoA2 
verification for certain types of fraud detection. Under the new framework providers are 
required to absorb the cost of detecting fraud in their price per successful verification 
(GOV.UK Verify 2014e). 
If an LoA2 account remains active after a year, the provider receives a second payment for 
ongoing maintenance of the account at the same level of assurance (this involves ongoing 
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evidence checks and fraud checks, for example). The payment is a percentage of their price 
for initial verification.  
Importantly, there is no payment for login or per transaction. Government pays for each 
verification (or renewal) and then the account can be used an unlimited number of logins to 
an unlimited range of services. This means that adding more services reduces the cost per 
transaction—there is no marginal cost for each service that adopts GOV.UK Verify and 
there is no charge per transaction (Glick 2017a; GOV.UK Verify 2017d). 
The GOV.UK Verify Code of Interoperability (2017d) explains how government service 
providers contribute to the running costs for Verify calculated on the basis of the number of 
users directed through GOV.UK Verify to the services. Departments must pay a maximum 
of £1.20 per User, per year to use GOV.UK Verify. The price paid will reduce if the cost of 
the programme is less than the income from departments however this is not expected to 
occur before 2020. 
For example, if 100,000 unique Verify’d identities sign in with GOV.UK Verify to access 
DWP services in a year across 1 million transactions the DWP will pay £120,000. Similarly, a 
user who signs in with GOV.UK Verify for self–assessment 5 times, claims a tax refund 
twice and company car tax once in financial year 2016–17 will cost £1.20 for HMRC, not 
£9.60 (£1.20 x 8) (GOV.UK Verify 2017d, sec. 4). 
Liability 
With government services acting as the relying party in identity transactions, questions of 
liability are significant. What is the liability/responsibility if an illegitimate identity transaction 
takes place? Such questions were never satisfactorily resolved with the previous UK Identity 
Cards Scheme as it was never clear what liability a government service provider would face if 
it relied on an official identity card (Whitley and Hosein 2010a). Would service provider 
liability be lower if they performed a biometric verification of the identity card compared to 
the liability associated with a visual inspection of the card? 
Questions of liability are particularly important in the case of Verify where commercial 
organisations are acting as identity providers for government service providers. Here, the 
active governance measures described below enable a model whereby a properly functioning 
identity provider should not be held liable for issuing a Verify’d identity to LoA2 that, it 
turns out, should not have been issued unless the issuing process did not comply with the 
identity proofing and verification checks specified in GPG 45. If, however, identity proofing 
and verification checks as outlined in GPG 45 are coupled with secure credentials that satisfy 
GPG 44 to interact across the Hub that has the active risk management and use of 
cryptographic measures described above, then neither the identity provider nor the service 
provider can reasonably be held liable for issues that arise. 
C. Building and Running Verify 
Alongside the GDS delivery approach that focuses on service design phases, Verify is also an 
active user of agile development methods (GOV.UK Verify 2016j). As Verify has grown, it 
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has been necessary to scale the agile methods to cope with the more complex governance 
arrangements for Verify. 
The process of managing a programme of the complexity of Verify within the timescales and 
cycles of Parliament, spending reviews, new technological capabilities etc. is very complex 
(GOV.UK Verify 2016k) and requires careful management. 
There are two main groups that manage the programme: the Senior Management Team and 
the Portfolio Group. The Senior Management Team meets on a weekly basis and is 
responsible for setting the vision for GOV.UK Verify, executive stakeholder management, 
managing programme budgets and team recruitment. The Senior Management Team 
includes all the people who lead teams in the programme and the weekly meeting includes 
each team reporting what’s going on for them that week. This helps ensure everyone across 
the programme is aware of what’s going on that week. 
The Portfolio Group also meets weekly and is responsible for managing the project portfolio 
within the programme. This is commonly where individual projects report on their overall 
status, ask for additional resource and solve delivery issues. The Portfolio Group, along with 
the Risk Management Group, is responsible for managing programme assets, such as the 
risk/issues register, programme plan and programme roles and responsibilities. 
In the spirit of agile, although teams are required to track their work and report status, Verify 
operates a “management by exception” principle so that projects can autonomously deliver 
as long as they stay within any confines (time, scope, budget) set by the Portfolio Group. 
This means that teams are free to choose the tools and the methods that best suit the task at 
hand (GOV.UK Verify 2016j). 
Amongst the techniques that Verify uses are careful studies of user needs (GDS 2017b; 
GOV.UK Verify 2016l), including extensive A/B testing of various parts of the user 
experience (GOV.UK Verify 2016m), in fact it was recently reported that the 100th round of 
user experience research had been completed (GOV.UK Verify 2016n). 
Verify has experimented with “mob programming” (GOV.UK Verify 2016o) whereby 
groups of between 3 and 7 people tackle one task at a time. During this process one person 
will “drive” the mouse and keyboard while the rest of the mob act as “navigators” by 
suggesting what source code needs to be produced (GDS 2016a). Mob programming was 
adopted in the expectation that it would help establish a shared and consistent understanding 
of how the new frontend to Verify would be built. Mob programming would also 
significantly reduce the chance of disruption to delivery when team members aren’t available. 
Alongside mob programming, the Verify technical team has also undertaken various group 
learning activities (GOV.UK Verify 2016p). 
The project has also started making part of Verify open source (GOV.UK Verify 2014f, 
2016q) as well as making the user front end available in Welsh (GOV.UK Verify 2016r). At 
the same time, efforts have been made to tidy up the code base (GOV.UK Verify 2016m). 
More recently, it has begun providing sandbox environments for private sector users to 
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experiment with integrating their own services with Verify (GOV.UK Verify 2017e; OIXUK 
2016b). 
Integration with Online Government Services 
Unlike many digital identity systems in other countries, Verify has been designed from the 
ground up to provide access to online government services. As noted above, from a 
technological perspective, the key technological component that needs to be developed is 
based around the matching service that takes the Verify’d matching data set and links this to 
the relevant record in the online government service. However, the process of “onboarding” 
government services to work with Verify is much more than this. 
To support this process, Verify has developed an “onboarding guide” for “government 
service providers wanting to learn about and integrate with GOV.UK Verify” (GOV.UK 
Verify 2016s). This involves a six-stage process that covers developing a proposal, needs 
analysis, planning, build and integration testing, production onboarding and beta stage. 
The proposal stage involves determining whether the government service needs to use 
Verify and, if so, the level of assurance required. Attempts to use Verify for services that 
don’t really need it tend to result in very poor completion rates for users who don’t have an 
existing Verify account. It is important, therefore, that the proposal stage has a clear 
understanding of what integration with Verify would seek to achieve and the Verify team 
works closely with government services beginning to think about integration with Verify 
(GOV.UK Verify 2015f). 
The needs assessment stage includes completing a full risk assessment of the digital service 
and agreeing the level of assurance required with the Service’s Senior Information Risk 
Officer (SIRO). The service is also expected to review the quality of its own data assets, 
particularly in reference to the matching process. The detailed analysis also includes 
identification of any known peaks in usage of the service (such as particular deadlines for 
completion of particular transactions) and any distinct demographic features of the user 
population (highlighting any that might currently find it difficult to obtain a Verify’d identity) 
(GOV.UK Verify 2014g). 
The planning stage includes consideration of any approvals needed to proceed with using 
Verify, the operational support model for the new service and the communications plan 
associated with integrating Verify with the service. Planning also includes delivery milestones 
(for alpha, beta and live) and the service’s approach to (system) testing. 
The build and integration testing approach involves building a service that sends SAML 
(Security Assertion Markup Language) authentication requests to, and receives SAML 
authentication responses from, the GOV.UK Verify Hub, building a local matching service 
that matches users’ verified identities to the service’s data sources, installing the matching 
service adapter provided by the GOV.UK Verify team and integrating it to the GOV.UK 
Verify Hub, running SAML compliance tests using the compliance tool, requesting public 
key infrastructure (PKI) test certificates for the GOV.UK Verify integration environment, 
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requesting access to the integration environment and running end–to–end testing of all the 
user journeys in the integration environment. 
Following this work, the final stages involve switching on the service to become a beta and 
then live service. It is also important to recall that Verify only provides a Verify’d identity to 
specified levels of assurance. It does not determine eligibility or entitlement to any particular 
service. These decisions (and the internal processes associated with them) are the 
responsibility of the service provider (GOV.UK Verify 2017d). 
Recognising that not all government services that want to use Verify will necessarily have the 
technical sophistication to build a matching service and integrate it with the Hub, Verify has 
broken the matching service into two components, the first is a matching service adapter 
that provide a SAML endpoint that links with the Hub as well as dealing with the message 
logic and cryptographic functionality. The adapter then interacts with a local matching 
service which uses data from the government service provider’s internal databases. Hiding 
key aspects of the matching service in this way allows for easier integration of new 
government services into Verify, see figure 18. 
Figure 18. Matching service adapter as a black box interface to Verify 
 
D. Verify’s Governance Arrangements 
Openness and Transparency 
A key feature of the GDS organisational culture is its attitude to learning, particularly 
learning about user needs. This means that, despite hiring top quality staff, it doesn’t assume 
that it knows best. One consequence of this for the Verify team is that there is a 
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presumption of openness whereby key activities and processes are made available publicly 
enabling feedback and comment (GOV.UK Verify 2016t). 
A simple example of this is the GDS performance dashboard for Verify (GOV.UK Verify 
2018b). This provides real–time access to the overall performance of Verify, including listing 
the various live services that Verify is integrated with, the total account use (i.e., 
authentications to date), see figure 19 (live data is available at (GOV.UK Verify 2018c)) and 
account use by existing users per week, see figure 20 (live data available at (GOV.UK Verify 
2018d)). 
In contrast, under the previous identity cards scheme, the only way to know about the 
number of identity cards that had been issued was when a MP was given a Parliamentary 
written answer (for example, on 16 June 2010 (shortly after the Coalition government came 
into power), a written answer (Parliament 2010) revealed that “Approximately 14,000 
identity cards had been issued to British citizens by 31 May 2010”). Nevertheless, publishing 
performance data in this way allows critics to point to issues with Verify (e.g., Moss 2016a). 
Figure 19. Number of users (October 2014–July 2018) 
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Figure 20. Existing users signing in each week (October 2014–July 2018) 
 
Embedding Privacy in Verify 
As noted above, the Privacy and Consumer Advisory Group (PCAG) was explicitly set up to 
ensure that the identity assurance programme “engages effectively with its stakeholders to 
incorporate issues related to privacy, trust and confidence during each of the design phases.” 
This was needed because “privacy and security are fundamental principles underpinning the 
new citizen–centric ID Assurance approach and unless the solution is trusted by users, they 
will not use it to safely log onto digital public services. The individual user must be able to 
control their own personal data and the ID Assurance Programme solution design is 
intended to this” (McCluggage 2011). 
After being brought up to speed on the overall vision for what would become Verify as well 
as a detailed understanding of the proposed architecture, one of the first tasks for the group 
was the development of a set of principles to underpin the operation and roll out of the 
identity assurance scheme. 
The principles are intended to “cover all aspects of the operation of a user–centric, identity 
assurance service which places the individual service–user in control of when and how they 
assert their identity” (GOV.UK Verify 2013a, sec. 2). The principles were developed using 
the expertise of the group and include considerations that are specific to the architecture of 
the system as well as current (and likely future) data protection laws including the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the principles behind them (OECD 1980; OPSI 
1998). They draw on specialist guidance around identity, including Kim Cameron’s Laws of 
Identity (Cameron 2005) and best practice in consumer support, see also Nyst et al. (2016, 
chap. 9). 
The draft principles were published for consultation in June 2013 and, following careful 
analysis of the responses to the consultation, a revised version (3.1) of the principles was 
published in September 2014. The high-level principles are explicitly presented using the 
first–person and active voice to reinforce the role of the citizen at the centre of the process. 
Now that Verify is a live service and there are plans to make it available beyond central 
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Government PCAG intends to review and possibly revise the principles, including providing 
further guidance on how to operationalise them. 
Recent research reports that there was a high level of awareness of the identity assurance 
principles amongst key members of the UK identity industry, with 78 percent of 
respondents feeling that having a set of privacy principles was very important to a cross 
industry identity approach and a similar proportion feeling that the privacy principles were 
very relevant to their sector or organisations (OIXUK 2016c). 
The Identity Assurance Principles 
User Control  
I can exercise control over identity assurance activities affecting me and these can only take 
place if I consent or approve them. 
This first principle perhaps best exemplifies the citizen–centric approach first advocated by 
Sir James Crosby (2008). It emphasises that the citizen, through giving consent to use the 
service, can trigger various identity assurance activities (typically logging on to a government 
service). If this consent is not forthcoming or is withdrawn it then follows that no activity 
can take place. This emphasis on consent also anticipated the strengthened consent 
requirements in the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation and post BREXIT UK Data 
Protection Act (GOV.UK 2017c, 2017d; OPSI 2018) 
One instance where consent issues were discussed in detail relate to the Hub identity picker 
service. The picker service is intended to guide users to the most appropriate identity 
providers for them, based on their answers to very simple questions such as whether they 
have a driving licence, passport or a smartphone that can install apps. A version of the hints 
service shares this data with identity providers to improve the registration process, but the 
data collected is not retained and is primarily intended to produce a list of identity providers 
that are likely to be able to provide a Verify’d identity given the data the user has available. 
Further discussions with PCAG revolved around whether the answers to these questions 
constituted “personally identifiable data” and whether it would be appropriate to obtain user 
consent to the collection of this data. The wording of the privacy notice was altered 
accordingly. 
Transparency 
Identity assurance can only take place in ways I understand and when I am fully 
informed. 
As described above, being open and transparent about what is happening during the identity 
assurance process is a key feature of the whole Verify programme. This principle reiterates 
this emphasis on transparency and is implemented in terms of detailed guidance about what 
happens to a user’s data on the website of the various identity providers and in their privacy 
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policies. This is discussed further in relation to Verify’s Data Protection Impact Assessment 
below. 
There is ongoing academic discussion about what it means to be “fully informed,” 
particularly about something as technologically sophisticated as the Verify architecture, but 
the intention is to ensure that the interested user can find as much information about the 
process as they desire without overburdening the average users who are less interested in this 
detail. 
Multiplicity 
I can use and choose as many different identifiers or identity providers as I want to. 
This principle is specific to Verify as the architecture is designed around a federated model 
with a number of certified identity providers. This principle allows users to create Verify’d 
identities with as many, or as few, identity providers as they wish. The author, for example, 
has a Verify’d identity with each of the existing identity providers. When coupled with the 
central role of the Hub, this means that government service providers cannot require users 
to obtain a Verify’d identity from a particular identity provider and as the hub only shares a 
matching data set that has been provided to agreed standards, shouldn’t need to. 
The federated approach with multiple identity providers allows users the option to segment 
their online interactions further (even though logically the Hub architecture means this 
shouldn’t be necessary), for example by choosing to use one identity provider to interact 
with the Department of Work and Pensions and another to interact with HM Revenue and 
Customs etc. 
This principle also allows for the situation where new identity providers who already have 
strong identity evidence for existing customers would be able to offer a Verify’d identity as 
part of their regular customer service proposition by becoming certified companies in future 
procurement rounds, even if those individuals already have Verify’d identities with other 
identity providers. For example, banks (who already have undertaken strong Know–Your–
Customer (KYC) checks) might allow customers to access online government services using 
their online banking account (Reuters 2016). 
Data Minimisation 
My interactions only use the minimum data necessary to meet my needs. 
Data minimisation is a data protection principle that was first explicitly articulated in the 
OECD principles as the “collection limitation principle” (OECD 1980). Data minimisation 
avoids the collection of extra data “just in case” it might be useful. As a described above, 
data minimisation applies during the identity proofing and verification stages whereby any 
data obtained as part of the verification process (e.g., passport number and date of issue) is 
not retained for purposes other than audit once the verification result has been obtained. 
Similarly, when a Verify’d identity is used to access a government service only a minimal 
matching data set is sent to the service via the Hub. 
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Data Quality 
I choose when to update my records.  
This principle is an explicit reaction to the identity management mentality that Sir James 
Crosby warned about in his report (2008). For example, in the UK, failure to notify the 
DVLA of a change of address is punishable with a fine of up to £1000 (GOV.UK 2018c). 
Verify does not impose any such obligation on users and hence doesn’t have the associated 
regulatory enforcement costs. Instead, if a user fails to update their records with the identity 
provider, this will either be picked up as part of the ongoing revalidation of their Verify’d 
identity or may cause the transaction with the government service provider to fail. 
Service User Access and Portability 
I have to be provided with copies of all of my data on request; I can move/remove my 
data whenever I want.  
This principle picks up on two themes. The first is the issue of explicit data portability 
introduced as part of the GDPR. Verify is a new service and so doesn’t emerge from existing 
legacy systems. As such, it is possible for the certified companies to build comprehensive 
and automatic data extraction capabilities into their systems. More generally, as the user is 
authenticated by the identity provider to a level that would allow them to interact with 
government, the user should also be able to complete an automatic, self–service “subject 
access request” to access this data rather than needing to submit a paper-based request. 
As this capability is not a formal requirement of the identity providers, the onboarding 
process currently only encourages them to accept such online subject access requests 
alongside paper-based applications whilst allowing them to use offline channels for further 
checks and payment. 
The principle also allows a user to revoke their consent for an identity provider to hold their 
Verify’d identity (Curren and Kaye 2010). This also ties in with the “right to erasure” in the 
GDPR and the associated Data Protection Act in the UK (GOV.UK 2017c; OPSI 2018). 
Certification 
I can have confidence in the Identity Assurance Service because all the participants have 
to be certified against common governance requirements.  
Although Verify implements a federated identity approach it places restrictions on which 
identity providers can participate. Because the transactions with the Hub are encrypted, only 
those identity providers that are certified by Verify (including for their compliance with the 
identity assurance principles) are issued with keys that will allow them to interact successfully 
with the Hub and associated services. This use of cryptographic keys also means, for 
example, that if a particular identity provider suddenly fails to satisfy the governance 
requirements (perhaps because of a security incident, financial problems or restructuring of 
its identity proofing and verification services) it is possible revoke their keys whilst retaining 
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the keys of the remaining identity providers. This would exclude, effectively instantly, the 
no–longer accredited identity provider from the federation. Additionally, if they were 
removed from the page where users select their chosen identity provider, they would be 
unable to initiate encrypted transactions via the Hub. 
Of course, this moves the issue to the question of what it means to be “certified against 
common governance requirements” (GOV.UK Verify 2014h) including how strictly the 
requirements are enforced and how they are interpreted (cf Moss 2016b). For example, does 
a rebadged identity service that is already provided by a certified provider need to be 
certified in its own right or can Verify rely on the accreditation of the underlying service? 
Similarly, user service requirements might allow ongoing use of a certified company while 
back office issues are being resolved, for example, responding to the regulatory 
consequences of the “safe harbour” ruling (Orlowski 2015). 
Dispute Resolution  
If I have a dispute, I can go to an independent Third Party for a resolution.  
Verify works on the assumption that, as a large-scale service, users will inevitably have some 
problems with the service. These could range from temporary service outages, 
misunderstandings about the scope and capability of the service to problems with identity 
proofing and verification. The dispute resolution principle provides for an independent third 
party that can help resolve any problems the user has, particularly in cases where initial 
attempts to resolve the issue with the identity provider have not proved satisfactory. 
The identity assurance principles are written for the time when the service is “mature and 
well established,” acknowledging that “in the early stages of its development there may well 
be a phasing–in period” and that, in some cases, “a principle might need a degree of initial 
flexibility” (GOV.UK Verify 2014a, para. 2.4). 
In the case of the dispute resolution principle, although Verify has undertaken discovery 
work around the dispute resolution/ombudsman role, disputes and queries are currently 
being addressed by the Verify customer support team (GOV.UK Verify 2016u). The team 
provides regular updates on the level and kinds of issues to the Privacy and Consumer 
Advisory Group as well as the Verify Senior Management Team. 
Exceptional Circumstances  
I know that any exception has to be approved by Parliament and is subject to 
independent scrutiny.  
It is recognised that there will be exceptional circumstances where the identity assurance 
principles need to be ignored. This principle seeks to ensure that any potential exceptions are 
explicitly discussed in Parliament rather than being implemented by statutory instruments 
(Parliament 2016) that are rarely properly debated. It also seeks to guard against the (mis)use 
of existing legislation, such as the use, in the UK, of Section 94 of the Telecommunications 
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Act 1984, that permits the Home Secretary to give “directions of a general character” which 
appear to be in the interests of national security to require a mobile phone company to hand 
over all call data (Strasburger 2016), or the use, in the USA, of the 1789 All Writs Act to 
compel Apple to decrypt smartphone data (Thomson 2014). 
Data Protection Impact Assessment 
As a government technology project, GOV.UK Verify was subject to a Privacy Impact 
Assessment (PIA) and Data Protection compliance check before the programme started in 
2013. As the programme has since evolved significantly, a fresh Privacy Impact Assessment 
(known as a Data Protection Impact Assessment in the GDPR) has been produced and 
provides “an analysis of core aspects of GOV.UK Verify from the perspective of a user” 
and is intended to help “understand their privacy–related needs” (GOV.UK Verify 2016v). 
The full impact assessment document has been published online (GOV.UK Verify 2016w). 
In addition, the Pan Government Accreditation Service has undertaken a government wide 
impact assessment. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given that Verify is an exemplar of how live systems can be built with 
privacy principles incorporated from the start, the detailed data protection compliance check 
only makes a small number of recommendations, for example that GDS should “should 
establish procedures to create and maintain a comprehensive record of use of personal data 
across the GOV.UK Verify ecosystem. The record should include details of processing 
carried out on GDS’ behalf. This record should be checked regularly” (2016w, p. 29), that 
GDS “should establish protocols to ensure the regular review of retention periods for 
personal data” (2016w, p. 34) and “should establish user support procedures for reviewing 
and responding to service user’s notice or a court order for rectification, blocking, erasure or 
destruction of personal data” (2016w, p. 38). 
In terms of compliance with the identity assurance principles, the impact assessment 
recommends that GDS “should mandate that certified companies are not permitted to 
solicit, infer or otherwise obtain information about the service user's interactions with 
Government Services (including knowing the identity of those Government Services)” 
(2016w, p. 51), that they “should ensure that certified companies and Government Services 
do not charge service users for access to their personal data (Subject Access)” (2016w, p. 54) 
and that GDS “regularly reviews the requirement for the identity assurance supervisor 
function [dispute resolution], which is currently served by the user support team and should 
expand the function should that be necessary” (2016w, p. 59) etc. 
Governance Structures 
The  identity assurance programme has very specific governance needs stemming from its 
dual role as a central provider of a cross government service and as the sole contractual 
authority with the market for identity services on behalf of central government. It has a 
number of governance needs, including: 
• department ownership of their plans to connect services to GOV.UK Verify; 
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• active and visible monitoring of progress by officials and Ministers; 
• change control, particularly relating to competing departmental priorities for Verify; 
• clear decision processes and escalation channels; 
• collective strategic decisions (policy, commercial, use of Verify beyond central 
government etc.). Alignment with wider government plans and goals for data, 
technology and digital services (GOV.UK Verify 2015d). 
Thus, governance activities take place at several different levels, see figure 21. 
Figure 21. Verify governance taken from (GOV.UK Verify 2015d) 
 
The Verify Team 
The Verify programme director is currently Jess McEvoy, who took over in August 2016 
from Janet Hughes, who had led the team since June 2013 (GOV.UK Verify 2016x). The 
Verify programme team is responsible for all aspects of the delivery of the Verify service as 
well as liaison with other government departments and external bodies. Verify is part of 
GDS, which is itself part of the Cabinet Office. The Minister for the Cabinet Office is David 
Lidington MP, a role previously held by Damian Green MP, Ben Gummer MP, Matt 
Hancock, MP and Francis Maude, MP (GDS 2016b, 2017c). The Director General of GDS 
since August 2016 is Kevin Cunnington (GDS 2016c). This new role replaces the role of 
Executive Director of GDS previously held by Stephen Foreshew–Cain and Mike Bracken. 
Contracts and the Framework Agreement 
Key functionality for Verify is provided by private sector identity providers (the certified 
companies) and their responsibilities are determined by their contractual relationship with 
the UK Government and the Verify team. Structurally, the contracts are based on 
Framework agreements. Framework agreements are a type of “umbrella” agreement 
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normally negotiated with suppliers by Crown Commercial Services on behalf of the public 
sector (GOV.UK 2015c), although the Verify Framework Agreement was negotiated by 
GDS. Framework agreements with providers set out terms and conditions under which 
agreements for specific purchases (known as call–off contracts) can be made throughout the 
term of the agreement (Crown Commercial Services 2016). 
To date there have been two framework agreements for Verify. Each begins with the issuing 
of a prior information notice (PIN) in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU). 
This notifies companies that they intend to start a formal procurement process (GOV.UK 
Verify 2014e). There are also specialist supplier events that describe, in more detail, what the 
government intends to procure. 
The first framework agreement resulted in contracts being signed with five potential identity 
providers (Digidentity, Experian, Mydex, The Post Office and Verizon) although Mydex 
never offered a live service and didn’t participate in the second framework agreement 
(GOV.UK Verify 2015g). The second framework brought the number of potential certified 
companies to nine (Barclays, Digidentity, Experian, GB Group, Morpho, PayPal, Post 
Office, Royal Mail and Verizon) although PayPal ended up withdrawing from the second 
framework (Merrett 2016b). 
Under the current frameworks, certified companies have to be certified by tScheme, an 
industry–led, self–regulatory scheme set up to create strict assessment criteria, against which 
it will approve various Trust Services (tScheme 2017). 
Alongside the privacy, security and associated business requirements that the certified 
companies must provide, the framework process also tries to ensure healthy competition in 
the marketplace of identity providers, to encourage innovation. To this end, the second 
framework agreement sought to restrict the number of organisations that “material sub–
contractors” (who assess and analyse evidence and data to meet one or more of the five 
elements of the identity proofing and verification process) could work for, so that Verify 
didn’t end up with a situation whereby all the certified companies were relying on a small 
number of “material sub–contractors” to do all the work involved in verifying a person’s 
identity (GOV.UK Verify 2014i). 
In July 2016 Verizon was “temporarily removed” as a certified company for Verify (Merrett 
2016c). This meant they were not listed as an option for new users from July 2016 and 
permanently withdrew thereafter (GOV.UK Verify 2017f). 
The identity assurance principles were not a formal part of the first framework procurement, 
although they were incorporated in the second framework, Part 17.1 Privacy of the 
Procurement 2 Framework Agreement. This required that identity providers were obliged to 
offer “a privacy policy (the “Provider Privacy Policy”) which is clear and easily 
comprehensible and which outlines (i) the steps the Provider, its Affiliates and Provider 
Personnel have taken to comply with the provisions in the Identity Assurance Principles 
which are applicable to such parties; and (ii) any measures they plan to implement in future” 
(GOV.UK Verify 2016w, sec. 7.2). 
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The identity assurance principles are not, however, one of the mandatory compliance 
requirements defined in Part 8.3 Provision of Services. They have, however, been reviewed 
as part of the privacy assessment (GOV.UK Verify 2016w, sec. 7). 
Code of Interoperability 
The GOV.UK Verify Code of Interoperability (CoIn) (GOV.UK Verify 2017d) plays an 
equivalent contractual role in relation to the government service providers that will consume 
Verify’d identities from the Hub. It describes the controls that organisations must implement 
and the responsibilities they must undertake to access GOV.UK Verify, and the 
responsibilities of Government Digital Service (GDS) in relation the GOV.UK Verify 
service. 
The signed CoIn takes effect as a Memorandum of Understanding between GDS and 
department that will use Verify services. It describes the controls that Relying Party 
organisations must implement and the responsibilities they must undertake in order to access 
GOV.UK Verify. In particular, this means that they are required to: 
• complete the Onboarding Process and provide all the evidence required as part of 
the Onboarding Process to the standard required within this process; and 
• comply with the requirements for security controls. 
The CoIn also details the payments associated with using GOV.UK Verify. 
Technological Controls 
Alongside the Good Practice Guides on RSDOPS and identity proofing and verification 
written by GDS in collaboration with CESG, CESG has published GPG (44) (GOV.UK 
2014) that relates to the use of identity credentials to support user authentication for online 
government services (GOV.UK Verify 2016y). This provides guidance about different types 
of credentials and the quality of authentication they can achieve (e.g., what kinds of 
protections they provide against misuse in the event of credential theft). The guidance also 
identifies different levels of quality for credentials (such as whether they contain protective 
measures that prevent prediction or duplication, whether any tokens resist tampering and 
whether they are tamper–evident). 
The guidance discusses the quality of different forms of credential management (including 
revocation) and active monitoring of credential use (e.g., the same credential being used in 
two very different physical locations at the same time). It also discusses the role that 
biometrics can play in authentication. 
SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) is used for all data flowing between the 
identity providers, the Hub and the service providers (GOV.UK Verify 2013b), see also 
(GOV.UK Verify 2015h, 2015i). With all data flows encrypted as they pass between the 
identity providers, the Hub and the service providers, another form of governance emerges, 
namely technological (cryptographic) enforcement of required standards and processes. An 
identity provider or service provider that fails to deliver a service that satisfies the norms, 
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service standards or contractual requirements of the Verify service can effectively be locked 
out of the system by revoking the encryption keys of the errant service and by removing it 
from the Verify interface. This form of governance allows for very rapid action, for example, 
as a result of a data breach and should help ensure that trust in Verify is maintained. 
This occurred recently, while Verizon completed its external certification process following a 
material change in the company’s contracting structure (Merrett 2016c). 
Risk Management Processes 
The technological controls put in place around Verify are best understood in relation to the 
Pan–Government Accreditation (PGA) service which seeks to manage risks related to the 
use, processing, storage and transmission of data. 
As with other parts of government, managing information assurance and security risks is a 
key part of the overall business of building and running public services (NAO 2016). 
GOV.UK Verify has specialist team members who follow a risk assessment methodology to 
define risk in a quantifiable and repeatable manner. They communicate those risks back into 
the programme Senior Management Team with recommendations on appropriate 
mitigations to those risks, allowing the right people to make informed decisions. The wider 
GOV.UK Verify team, including its security experts, provide support to ensure that what 
they are doing is appropriate and sensible (GOV.UK Verify 2016i). 
There are two groups within the GOV.UK Verify team that are responsible for looking at 
risk more broadly: the risk management group and portfolio group. These groups work to 
ensure Verify has the resources available to mitigate identified risks in a timely manner. The 
risk assessment process evaluates the impact of something going wrong, understands who 
poses a threat and how they will attempt to gain access and analyses the motivation and 
capability of identified threats. As such, they follow industry standard good practice and 
apply it to the Verify service. Based on this risk assessment they then establish baseline 
controls and work with the technical development team to work out the best technological 
controls to protect Verify. Additional mechanisms available include procedural and 
operational implementation controls, staff management and supervision and physical 
controls to ensure the protection of equipment and people. Additionally, monitoring and 
audit checks whether all the controls are working. 
Because Verify a cross–government service, the senior information risk owner for GOV.UK 
Verify reports to the Government Senior Information Risk Owner (GSIRO). The GSIRO 
has cross–government remit and responsibilities including responsibility for making sure that 
GOV.UK Verify is managing its risk appropriately. 
The GSIRO needs to know that what the programme are telling them about potential risks 
and mitigation is accurate. To facilitate that an independent person, known as an Accreditor, 
is normally appointed to act as an arbiter of risk. In the case of GOV.UK Verify it has two 
Accreditors. One is from GDS (but outside the GOV.UK Verify team): they make sure the 
team consider all risks and apply the appropriate controls in line with Cabinet Office policy. 
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The other is a Pan Government Accreditor (PGA) from CESG: they ensure that risks to 
wider government are considered and reported back to the GSIRO. 
The regular meetings that take place between the independent Accreditors and members of 
the GOV.UK Verify team mean that there is a constant open communication channel 
between all those concerned about security risk (GOV.UK Verify 2016i). This process 
includes active monitoring of potential threats as well as checking for attempts to introduce 
false/fake documents as part of the registration process. 
Another key part of this process is ensuring effective plans are in place for the eventuality 
that Verify might be offline (GOV.UK Verify 2016z). 
PCAG Guidance 
As noted above, PCAG’s identity assurance principles formed part of the second 
procurement framework and whilst they are not currently a mandatory compliance 
requirement, the most recent data protection assessment made only limited 
recommendations for ensuring that the principles continue to be complied with. PCAG 
therefore plays a non–standard role in the governance of Verify. It is a body that is 
independent of the Verify team and the Cabinet Office more generally, although GDS notes 
that it is guided by PCAG (amongst others) (GDS 2018c). PCAG is a signatory to the World 
Bank principles on identification (World Bank 2017) and is described there as the “Privacy 
and Consumer Advisory Group to the Government Digital Service and GOV.UK.” Its 
scope has primarily been around identity assurance although it has advised ministers and civil 
servants about privacy and consumer issues around government data handling more broadly. 
As can be seen by the incorporation of its identity assurance principles in the framework 
procurement process, there is a strong, symbiotic working relationship with the Verify team, 
whereby the advice of PCAG is sought on all key decisions. 
E. Verify: Life After Live 
In the months since May 2016 when Verify became a live service, there have been a number 
of significant changes in the leadership of GDS and the Verify team. The Cabinet Reshuffle 
following Teresa May’s appointment as Prime Minister in July 2016 resulted in a new 
Minister for the Cabinet Office, Ben Gummer MP (GDS 2016b). A few weeks later saw the 
arrival of Kevin Cunnington as Director General of GDS. This new role gives GDS a similar 
status to other significant parts of the civil service. Cunnington was previously Director 
General for Business Transformation in the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). 
Shortly after his arrival, Janet Hughes decided to leave GDS and she has been replaced by 
Jess McEvoy as interim Programme Director. 
Given this level of staff turnover, it is understandable that there has been press speculation 
about the fate of GDS and the Verify team (Evenstad 2016a, 2016b; Virgo 2016). 
Cunnington has brought in some of his own advisers from DWP (Glick 2016a) to assess all 
aspects of GDS’s operations and develop a new strategy for GDS by the end of 2016 
(Bicknell 2016a). 
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In early February 2017, GDS released its Government Transformation Strategy (GDS 2017a, 
2017d) for the period 2017–2020. This included a commitment to making better use of 
GOV.UK Verify by working towards 25 million users by 2020 and exploring options for 
delivery of identity services for businesses and intermediaries. This strategy fed into the UK 
Digital Strategy (GOV.UK 2017b) and its proposals for maintaining the UK government as 
a world leader in serving its citizens online (GOV.UK 2017a). 
In April 2017, the Prime Minister called a surprise general election. Ben Gummer was a lead 
author of the Conservative Party manifesto (Conservative Party 2017) which included a 
whole section on digital government and public services. This committed a future 
Conservative government to using “common platforms across government and the wider 
public sector.” This would include Verify as a “single, common and safe way of verifying 
themselves to all parts of government” stating that this “is why we shall roll out Verify, so 
that people can identify themselves on all government online services by 2020, using their 
own secure data that is not held by government.” The manifesto continued noting that the 
government “will also make this platform more widely available, so that people can safely 
verify their identify to access non-government services such as banking” (2017, p. 81). 
Although the government lost its majority in Parliament following the election, and 
Gummer lost his seat, the manifesto commitments remain the policy of the (minority) 
government. 
This explicit commitment to Verify was particularly timely in light of external pressures on 
Verify. In February 2017, a blog by HMRC digital seemed to imply that transformations in 
the Government Gateway (due to close in its current incarnation in 2018) meant that HMRC 
was going to provide an alternative identity service to Verify (Cellan-Jones 2017). When 
journalists picked up on this issue and highlighted the potential public confusion and higher 
bill for the public purse, HMRC rapidly backed down and clarified that it didn’t intend to 
provide an alternative to Verify and reiterated its support for Verify beyond the revamp of 
the Government Gateway (Bicknell 2017; Burton 2017a, 2017b; Fiveash 2017; Glick 2017b; 
Merrett 2017a). 
In March 2017, the NAO report on digital transformation included a specific section 
reviewing GOV.UK Verify warning that take–up of Verify has been undermined by its 
performance and GDS had lost focus on the longer term strategic case for the programme 
(NAO 2017, para. 18) echoing some of the concerns raised in an earlier report by the 
Institute for Government (2016). Moreover, PCAG co–chair Jerry Fishenden, who had been 
part of the NAO team, resigned from his GOV.UK Verify role and called for a fundamental 
review of Verify (Fishenden 2017; Glick 2017c). 
In terms of Verify, although the time for it to be a live service has affected Britain’s progress 
on digital government (Bicknell 2016b), Cunnington is reportedly “very bullish” about Verify 
(Glick 2016b) and now that it is a live service is keen for its adoption to be expanded, 
including working closely with local authorities and the private sector. Verify is seen by 
Kevin Cunnington as a key enabler for the kinds of digital transformations needed to give 
government the right tools to get the job done (GDS 2016d). 
57 
New services with existing Departments are proceeding through the various onboarding 
stages (GOV.UK Verify 2016aa). Other application areas, including integration with the 
National Health Service are also being considered (Merrett 2016d). 
This emphasis on increasing the use of Verify and increasing its take up is supported by the 
certified companies, some of whom are reporting earnings issues because of the lower than 
anticipated use of Verify (Schonberg 2016). 
Working with Local Authorities 
A major development, already in process before Cunnington arrived at GDS but given 
increased prominence under him, is the exploration of how Verify can be used by local 
authorities (GOV.UK Verify 2016ab). Following the GDS approach, this work has begun 
with a discovery phase. This has resulted in interactions with 80 local authorities who 
provided details about the transaction costs and volume data needed in support of pilot 
projects from more than 60 local authorities (GOV.UK Verify 2016ac). 
Some local authority applications (e.g., parking permit, concessionary travel and taxi 
licensing services) need to combine identity data with driving related attributes based on data 
held by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) and so two discovery days were 
held with DVLA and involving participants from 41 councils (GOV.UK Verify 2016ad). 
Verify has already worked collaboratively with the DVLA on the design of a number of their 
services (GOV.UK Verify 2016ae). 
Following this discovery work, two pilots are underway (GOV.UK Verify 2016b). These 
relate to older people’s concessionary travel and residents’ parking permit services. These are 
services that most local authorities are looking to transform. In order to participate in the 
pilot studies, local authorities must agree to the requirements of the pilot project agreement 
which includes buy–in and participation from key stakeholders, a commitment in principle 
to implement GOV.UK Verify in accordance with various standards including the identity 
assurance principles (Merrett 2016e). 
Nineteen local authorities have signed up for the #VerifyLocal pilots, six of whom will pilot 
both services (GOV.UK Verify 2016af). A lot of local authorities, including many of the 
pilot participants, work directly with suppliers to provide aspects of their services and so 
local authority integration in such cases will also involve integration with the systems 
provided by these suppliers. A distinct strand of discovery work is being undertaken to 
better understand these requirements (GOV.UK Verify 2016ag).  
Private Sector Use of Verify’d Identities 
From the earliest days of Verify, the programme team has engaged with the private sector, 
not simply to support the verification process or to become an identity provider or in their 
role as the providers of services for local authorities. Rather the engagement has been based 
on the premise that the logic of performing a one–time verification and then being able to 
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use a Verify’d identity that was “good enough for government” for commercial transactions 
would offer additional benefits to citizens (UKAuthority.com 2016). 
In order to explore these possibilities, in 2012 the Verify team became a founder member of 
OIXUK—the UK chapter of the Open Identity eXchange. OIXUK a nonprofit, technology 
agnostic, collaborative cross sector membership organisation with the purpose of 
accelerating the adoption of digital identity services based on open standards. 
Verify uses OIXUK “to communicate with the marketplace for identity assurance supply 
and to support experimental alpha and discovery projects that explore the real-world 
business, design and technical challenges that will shape the adoption of digital identity 
services based on open standards.” A number of OIXUK discovery projects have been 
undertaken. Resulting white papers are available on the OIXUK website (OIXUK 2018). 
For example, a recent OIX report (OIXUK 2016c), highlighted industry’s needs for identity 
related attributes that go beyond the matching data set of core identity attributes (name, 
address, date of birth and optionally gender). 
Other reports explore the possible use of Verify’d identities for the peer–to–peer economy, 
for creating a pensions dashboard (Merrett 2017b), to transform attitudes and behaviours 
towards savings, to open a bank account and undertake financial transactions in another 
country, as well as opening an account in the UK before arriving (GOV.UK Verify 2016ah) 
and digital “blue badges” which enable special parking allowances for individuals with 
mobility issues. 
There have also been OIXUK technical reports around attribute exchange, shared signals 
(for spotting and sharing threats) and the role of mobile operators in the digital identity 
space. 
EU Integration, eIDAS, and BREXIT 
On 23 June 2016 a referendum in the UK voted (52 percent/48 percent) in favour of the 
UK leaving the European Union, the so–called BREXIT. The new Prime Minister, Theresa 
May, has confirmed that BREXIT will be taking place and she invoked “article 50,” and thus 
initiated the process whereby the UK leaves the EU two years later, at the end of March 
2017. At the time of writing, the implications for Verify in terms of EU interactions are 
unclear. Nevertheless, it is possible draw a number of inferences based on previously issued 
statements. 
The first implication is that for most aspects of its service, BREXIT will have no direct 
effect on the function and operation of Verify. Verify enables secure online transactions with 
the UK government and BREXIT will have no effect on this. Similarly, identity evidence 
from other EU countries will continue to be assessed in the same ways as before (although 
one consequence of BREXIT might be a lower demand for verification of EU documents as 
a result of reduced numbers of EU citizens living and working in the UK). 
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As part of arrangements to support labour mobility within Europe, European Member 
States want people to be able to identify themselves online for digital services in other 
countries. To achieve this, Member States have agreed to set up a system that will allow 
people to use a digital identity verified in one country to access public services in other 
countries. This is covered in the eIDAS regulations, which also cover the interoperability of 
electronic digital signatures (European Commission 2016). 
Under this process, the eIDAS regulations set up arrangements whereby a user will be able 
to choose to verify their identity with one country’s system, in order to use a digital service 
from another country (Tsakalakis et al. 2017). For example, it would be possible to use a 
GOV.UK Verify account to prove identity to the Danish tax authorities, making it easier to 
file a tax return for individuals who live or work there. Formally, eIDAS is concerned with 
the mutual acceptance of eID across borders through authentication of a verified identity, 
that is the user chooses to authenticate with their home member state’s eID rather than 
verifying their identity in the other country. 
When a user wants to access a service in a different country to the one that has verified their 
identity, those two countries’ identity assurance services will need to be able to trust and talk 
to each other securely. The eIDAS Regulation sets out the rules of how this will work and 
recently the standards and supporting details have been agreed. 
The plan is for citizens to use their trusted national digital identity scheme to sign–in to any 
relevant EU Member State service. eIDAS also covers “legal persons” (i.e., businesses) and 
businesses operating in the UK are likely to use eIDAS to file things such as VAT returns, 
export licenses and intellectual property rights. 
As long as the digital identity scheme used by a Member State meets the assurance levels set 
down in the Regulation (GOV.UK Verify 2015j), the scheme can be used to transfer 
identities across the system to a service. This means the UK can continue using GOV.UK 
Verify, while other countries can use their national identity card schemes. These different 
approaches can work together to make it possible for users to access digital services across 
borders. Verify’s role in shaping the legislation means that it will be relatively straightforward 
to map the Verify levels of assurance to the levels of assurance specified in eIDAS. The EU 
federated approach also does not require a central EU database or a single, persistent, unique 
national identity number and as such, unsurprisingly, is compatible with the approach taken 
by Verify. 
In November 2015, the Verify team were reporting that, now that the relevant standards and 
legislation had been agreed, they were looking at how to implement them in the UK (a 
process that would involve “notifying” the EU that Verify was ready to be part of this 
interoperable system) (GOV.UK Verify 2015k). 
With BREXIT, consideration of whether to include Verify within the EU system is likely to 
be something to be negotiated alongside other aspects of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. 
Nevertheless, from 2018, the UK will be legally required to accept identities from other 
member state’s notified schemes. 
60 
One indirect consequence of the eIDAS regulations has been their incorporation in the latest 
anti–money–laundering (AML) regulations. In particular, a new AML directive adopted in 
2016 includes full consistency with provisions on electronic identification as governed by the 
eIDAS regulation (GOV.UK Verify 2016ai). Given that Verify is already aligned with 
eIDAS, the next steps are to transpose the EU regulation into UK national bank regulations 
(and hope that they remain in place post BREXIT). As the Verify team note, “this explicit 
cross reference to government identity verification standards in the new AML Directive sets 
the regulatory framework that will facilitate bank acceptance of a user’s digital identity” 
(GOV.UK Verify 2016ai). The implications of this for the customer account opening 
process may well be significant. 
Future Government Services Using Verify 
A blog post in May 2016 (GOV.UK Verify 2016aj) reviewed the scale of current services 
connected to Verify as well as other government services that were in the process of 
onboarding with Verify. 
Table 4. Live and onboarding central government uses of Verify 
Department Service Status Total users/year Anticipated new 
users sent to 
GOV.UK Verify 
by April 2017 
DfT/DVLA View or share 
your driving 
licence 
information 
Connected 
September 2015; 
in public beta 
15m 100–400k 
DfT/DVLA Tell DVLA 
about your 
medical 
condition 
Connected May 
2016; in private 
beta 
300k 50–90k 
DWP Sign in to the 
Universal Credit 
digital account 
Connected 
March 2015; in 
public beta 
(restricted by 
postcode) 
10m >5k 
DWP/HMRC Check your state 
pension 
Connected April 
2015; in public 
beta 
3m 100–300k 
HMRC Sign in and file 
your self–
assessment tax 
return 
Connected 
December 2014; 
in public beta 
3m >100k 
HMRC Sign in to your 
personal tax 
account 
Connected July 
2015; in public 
beta. 
–  
100–200k 
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HMRC Check your 
income tax 
estimate 
Connected 
February 2015; 
in public beta. 
Also accessible 
via personal tax 
account. 
2m Volumes include 
users accessing 
these services 
directly via start 
pages and 
through the 
personal tax 
account 
HMRC Check or update 
your company 
car tax 
Connected 
February 2014; 
Live service. 
Also accessible 
via personal tax 
account. 
70k 
HMRC Claim a tax 
refund 
Connected 
March 2015; in 
public beta. 
Now only 
accessible via 
personal tax 
account. 
95k 
HMRC Help your 
friends or family 
with their tax 
Connected 
March 2015; in 
public beta. Also 
accessible via 
personal tax 
account. 
– 
BIS/Insolvency 
Service 
Claim for 
redundancy and 
monies owed 
Connected 
February 2015; 
in public beta 
100k 30k 
Defra Claim rural 
payments 
Connected July 
2014; in public 
beta 
90k 5–10k 
HMRC Tax credits 
service 
Connected 
February 2015 as 
part of a limited 
trial; trial ended 
in July 2015. 
 
Service is about 
to reconnect 
June 2016 
3m 150k 
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The following services are planning to use Verify (GOV.UK Verify 2016aj): 
Table 5. Future central government uses of Verify 
Department Service Status Anticipated 
GOV.UK Verify 
users in the next year 
NHS England View your personal 
health record (NHS 
Liverpool Clinical 
Commissioning Group 
pilot) 
Planning to connect 
June 2016 
5k 
DfT/DVLA Apply for an operator 
licensing certificate 
Planning to connect 
July 2016 
<5k 
BIS/Insolvency 
Service 
Declare bankruptcy 
online 
Planning to connect 
July 2016 
10k 
BIS/Land Registry Sign your mortgage 
deed 
Planning to connect 
September 2016 
TBC, Summer 2016 
DWP Activate your state 
pension 
Planning to connect 
October 2016 
<5k 
DWP Apply for the Personal 
Independence 
Payment 
Planning to connect 
October 2016 
TBC, Summer 2016 
HMRC Apply for childcare 
support 
Planning to connect 
November 2016 
10–20k 
HO/Disclosure and 
Barring Service 
Apply for a basic 
check 
Planning to connect 
December 2016 
50k 
DWP Access to work Planning to connect 
October to 
December 2016 
15k 
DWP Child maintenance Planning to connect 
2017 
TBC, Winter 2016 
DWP Bereavement support Planning to connect 
2017 
TBC, Winter 2016 
DfE/Ofsted Childminder or 
childcare provider 
Planning to connect 
2017 
5k 
NI Register a child’s birth 
in Northern Ireland 
TBC TBC 
MOJ File for uncontested 
divorce 
TBC TBC 
HMRC Inheritance tax online TBC TBC 
HMRC View your medical 
benefit 
TBC TBC 
BIS/Companies House Voluntary dissolution 
of a company 
TBC TBC, Winter 2016 
DfT/DVLA Amend your driver 
record 
TBC TBC 
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Limitations and Critiques 
There are a number of limitations with Verify. Some of these, such as problems that certain 
groups in society face when trying to get a Verify’d identity, are a consequence of the 
decision to use a standards-based approach to identity proofing and verification and the 
implications of the requirements of these standards. Coverage problems are (hopefully) 
resolvable and can be addressed by including additional identity evidence data following 
better analysis of the demographics of who has which evidence that is needed for a Verify’d 
identity. Other options include consideration of supported verification (for those who have 
appropriate documentation but need assistance in completing the verification process) as 
well as the introduction of LoA1 and services that can use LoA1 Verify’d identities. 
Moreover, as the identity providers are only paid for successful registrations, they have a 
strong incentive to identify and use new data sources that will enable them to provide 
Verify’d identities for as many customers as possible. 
Alongside the decision to base Verify on agreed standards is the decision to use private 
sector companies to implement the various identity related activities the standards require, a 
decision that not all stakeholders are necessarily comfortable with.  
Other limitations, as noted by a recent OIXUK report, relate to the deliberately limited 
matching data set that is sent by the identity provider via the Hub to the service provider 
(OIXUK 2016c). There are a number of scenarios where the matching data set needs to be 
enhanced with (or, occasionally replaced by) attribute exchange. For example, a possible 
electronic voting service would need an “entitlement to vote” attribute to be exchanged 
alongside identity data. In other scenarios, an “over 18” attribute might be all that is needed 
to access age restricted goods and services. 
There are a number of ways in which Verify might integrate with such attribute exchange 
capabilities. Alternatively, attribute exchanges might choose to draw on the lessons learned 
from the Verify approach when implementing a non–Verify service. 
Another area where Verify is not operating concerns organisation related identities. 
Although GPG 46 (GOV.UK 2013) relates to establishing the identities of organisations or 
individuals acting on behalf of those organisations, the currently preferred approach is for 
the organisations to assert who their authorised individuals are and then, if necessary, to use 
Verify to ensure that only Verify’d identities are used by these authorised individuals when 
acting on behalf of their organisation. A version of this approach has been implemented in 
terms of rural payments although it has not been widely adopted by government services 
that make extensive use of people acting as agents for others (e.g., those with powers of 
attorney or accountants completing tax returns on behalf of their clients). 
A final limitation of Verify relates to the number of individuals who fail to complete the 
Verify registration process to obtain a Verify’d identity. As noted above, some of these 
incomplete service journeys may be the result of demographic difficulties in obtaining a 
Verify’d identity or issues with the implementation of the standards. Others, however, might 
arise when a government service inappropriately requires Verify and a LoA2 Verify’d identity 
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to access the service. Internal Verify data suggests that completion rates are far higher in 
those situations where users have an immediate benefit than those where the benefits are 
less apparent. Thus, services like completing a self–assessment on time and not being fined 
for late submission or claiming a tax refund are most likely to result in the successful 
creation of a Verify’d identity. They are also, of course, the services most likely to be targeted 
by fraudsters and hence carry an associated requirement for proper identity proofing and 
verification and active security monitoring. 
Alongside the acknowledged limitations and design choices associated with Verify, a number 
of critiques exist. These have been raised at various levels of operation. For example, the 
paper by Brandão et al. (2015) highlights concerns about the technical design choices in 
Verify and their vulnerability to various risks and attacks. 
Other concerns have been raised about the inclusion of gender in the matching data set. 
Whilst there is scope for gender to act as a useful further disambiguation mechanism for the 
matching process, it also raises the prospect, particularly for transgendered individuals, that 
the matching process will fail and require users to disclose, unnecessarily, their transgender 
identity even to government service providers whose internal processes do not use gender 
(Currah and Mulqueen 2011; Martin and Whitley 2013). It is for these reasons that the 
gender field is optional in the matching data set and does not need to be provided in the 
initial registration process. 
A concern related to both of these points involves the recognition that the matching data set 
is used in all Verify transactions and so is being shared (in encrypted form) quite widely. 
Further concerns arise when, for operational reasons, a (semi)persistent identifier is used to 
speed up the matching process. That is, once a Verify’d identity from a particular identity 
provider is matched against a service provider’s database, a unique identifier (for that pairing 
of identity, identity provider and service provider) is created, meaning that the matching 
process can be bypassed if that pairing reoccurs. These internal identifiers are simply 
intended to speed up the matching process and can be revoked (requiring a repeat of the 
matching process) as required. 
There are probably a number of factors behind the decisions by two certified companies, 
who were part of their relevant framework agreements, to not offer identity provider 
services and for Verizon to withdraw from offering identity provider services. Whether these 
relate to internal reorganisations, concerns about being able to use niche identity evidence 
checking services for specialist communities or other issues, the high profile of Verify means 
that any such issues might either undermine confidence in the service or enhance confidence 
through being clear that only certified companies who can deliver to the quality level the 
government requires participate in Verify. 
Finally, it has taken Verify over five years to become a live service. Critics suggest that this is 
an unreasonably long time for the service to become live and successful. Although this 
matches the experiences of other exemplar digital identity systems such as the Estonian 
model, it does introduce concerns about the long–term viability of Verify. 
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One potential explanation for the slower than desired roll out of Verify is that, as an 
exemplar, Verify had to do a lot of the background work that had only been hinted at in 
proof–of–concept federated identity systems for citizens. Certainly, a lot has been learned in 
the process and much of the information is available in the public domain and in open 
standards, whether it relates to identity proofing and verification, the requirements for strong 
authentication credentials, open sourced software or the SAML profiles associated with 
delivering the services. Another partial explanation relates to the amount of business process 
transformation that is required when Verify’d identities are used in legacy processes. 
F. Learning from Verify 
Although Verify emerged as a response to a very specific socio–political context in the UK, 
the Verify model contains many features which can inform identity policies in other 
countries and contexts. At one level it is possible to explicitly use (parts of) the Verify model 
directly in alternative contexts, as is the case with the EU eIDAS regulations (European 
Commission 2016) and the work of the Australian Digital Transformation Office (Easton 
2016; Head 2016). In fact, GDS has a special “international team” that is responsible for 
such international collaborations, ranging from participation in international standards 
bodies through to hosting visiting international guests (GDS 2016e). 
Alternatively, the design choices that underpin the Verify model can provide a useful 
template against which current and future identity practices can be contrasted. The intention 
in this case is provide an alternative approach against which to review the reasons for the 
proposed practices against the reasons why Verify might do things differently. For example, 
reflecting on the innovations that arise from Verify’s use of multiple identity providers may 
provide trigger innovative improvements in the customer experience even when the 
government acts as the sole identity provider. 
The World Bank’s principles on identification in a digital age (World Bank 2017). present ten 
principles are “fundamental to maximizing the benefits of identification systems for 
sustainable development while mitigating many of the risks” (World Bank 2017, p. 3). They 
provide a convenient structure for reflecting on how the Verify model can inform identity 
systems globally. 
1. Ensuring Universal Coverage for Individuals from Birth to Death, 
Free from Discrimination 
In some contexts, this principle might involve explicit attempts to ensure that under–
represented groups such as women or the rural poor are able to enrol in the identity system 
(e.g., Abraham et al. 2017; Nyst et al. 2016). In the context of GOV.UK Verify, it can be 
understood specifically in relation to the work involved in improving the demographic 
coverage that is supported by Verify including supporting individuals in creating their 
Verify’d identity (GOV.UK Verify 2016u, 2016ak, 2017c; OIXUK 2017a). It also involves 
ensuring that assisted digital paths are available for all government services. 
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2. Removing Barriers to Access and Usage and Disparities in the 
Availability of Information and Technology 
Alongside traditional considerations about literacy, access to technology and appropriate 
support, GOV.UK Verify also highlights the importance of careful service (re)design. For 
many services, a Verify’d identity may not be necessary or may not be needed to LoA2. A 
failure to carefully design appropriate user journeys may result in poor user experiences and 
reduced trust in both the identity system and the government service. 
For example, when reviewing the completion rate on the Verify dashboard (GOV.UK Verify 
2018b) (i.e., the proportion of visits started on GOV.UK Verify that result in successfully 
accessing a service, following the creation or re–use of a verified account with a certified 
company) there is a marked difference between the highest performing service (around 74 
percent completion) and the average of all services (around 35 percent completion). Much of 
this variation can be attributed to the appropriateness of the service (re)design for each of 
the services. 
3. Establishing a Robust—Unique, Secure, and Accurate—Identity 
Perhaps the most easily adapted aspect of Verify is its use of a risk and standards-based 
approach to identity verification and authentication. As discussed in Section B the risk-based 
approach recognises that the quality of identity credentials can vary from context to context. 
For accessing Government services online, particularly those that involve the government 
making welfare payments the UK has decided that an identity that satisfies Level of 
Assurance 2 (LoA2) is required. Other parts of government, in contrast, might need 
different levels of assurance (Glick 2016b). 
Adopting a risk-based perspective ensures that such issues are explicitly considered by the 
appropriate risk owner and can result in processes that are fit for purpose rather than the all 
too often default position that accepts the use of very high levels of identity assurance for all 
applications. 
Having determined the required level(s) of assurance needed for various government 
services, Verify sets standards for determining what forms of identity evidence satisfy the 
level of assurance that is required. Verify’s approach to specifying what is required to satisfy 
a particular level of assurance explicitly includes consideration of both errors and targeted 
attempts to create fraudulent identities. It does not rely on biometric deduplication to ensure 
uniqueness (to a required level of assurance). 
A LoA2 Verify’d identity therefore requires an identity evidence package that includes data 
about different aspects of an individual’s life (citizen, money and living). Thus, although the 
UK has a well–functioning civil registration system, a birth certificate is only considered as 
level 2 identity evidence associated with citizenship and, unlike many contexts, is an 
insufficient basis for an identity that reaches LoA2. If a birth certificate is combined with 
two other pieces of data at level 2 (e.g., a national 60+ bus pass or a residential property 
rental or purchase agreement), or with one piece of data at level 3 (e.g., ICAO compliant 
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passport, mortgage account or student loan account) it can form the basis of a LoA2 
Verify’d identity (GOV.UK 2018a, chap. A). 
The identity standards that Verify uses also include consideration of the authentication 
methods associated with the use of a Verify’d identity. Without clear guidance on 
authentication requirements, any effort to provide high levels of assurance in the identity 
evidence can be undermined by low quality authentication, such as is the case where a high 
quality identity credential might be used with a “flash–and–go” visual inspection of the 
credential (cf Abraham et al. 2017). 
Adopting this approach to other contexts will involve both a calibration of the levels of 
assurance needed for particular government and private sector services and a recognition of 
quality and availability of existing identity evidence. For example, it may be that a state issued 
voter card is considered sufficient to allow someone to vote but is deemed unsuitable for 
determining eligibility for benefits (Gelb and Diofasi 2016, sec. 5). A standards-based 
approach can help with the transformation of this issue by forcing an explicit consideration 
of the strengths and weaknesses of various identity credentials including the integrity of their 
issuance as well as associated concerns about population coverage. 
It is important to recognise that the level of assurance associated with a claimed identity is 
not static. In Verify, ongoing checking could reveal potential issues with the identity 
evidence package, for example the passport that was used might later be reported lost or 
stolen. Alternatively, it is possible to create an account with a limited level of assurance, 
associate this with strong authentication methods and then, over time, build up the identity 
evidence package to support high levels of assurance (cf Gelb and Manby 2016). Even if 
further documentation is not added to the identity evidence package, it will be possible to 
strengthen the activity history associated with the existing identity evidence. 
As a result, although Verify might come across as only being suitable for those contexts 
where diverse and good quality sources of identity evidence already exist, such an identity 
evidence building approach could succeed in situations where existing sources of identity 
evidence are relatively poor (Nyst et al. 2016). In addition, context–sensitive alternative 
sources of identity evidence, such as those enabled by social media usage or mobile phone 
contracts, can be incorporated into the identity evidence building process. Verify’s 
experiences about the range of data sources that can be used and their relative coverage can 
provide useful inputs into this process. 
4. Creating a Platform that Is Interoperable and Responsive to the 
Needs of Various Users 
As Verify has been built from scratch, it has been explicitly designed to ensure 
interoperability across services. As discussed in Section C, Verify endeavours to provide 
detailed documentation to assist with the interfacing to existing service provider systems 
(GOV.UK Verify 2017g). Indeed, recognising that not all government departments will have 
the technological capacity to integrate with the Verify hub in a secure manner, it offers a 
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matching service adaptor that provides much of the functionality that service providers need 
to be able to link to it. In a similar manner, with plans to integrate private sector reuse of 
Verify’d identities it is also possible to experiment with a Verify sandbox (OIXUK 2016b). 
A recent report by the BCS Identity Assurance Working Group (2016) proposes a series of 
criteria that might be used to distinguish a good online identity system from a poor one. 
Members of the Working Group are in PCAG and so their analysis was likely to have been 
shaped by their knowledge of Verify. As a consequence, the working group criteria can be a 
way to reflect on being responsive to the needs of users of identity services. 
In terms of the approach adopted by the BCS working group, rather than focusing on 
features of the technology (is it a smart card?, which agency issues it?, etc.) features that 
make up what Orlikowski (2000) calls the technological artefact the report focuses on the 
technology–in–practice. Thus it starts with some basic questions: What is the purpose of the 
Scheme? How strong (in terms of levels of assurance) is it? and Who is it for? 
A key feature of Verify, that stems from its origins within the Government Digital Service, is 
the emphasis placed on user needs. As the GDS Service Design Manual notes, “Building a 
digital service is a complex task, with many risks. … As the service progresses through 
development you'll find out more about users’ needs, development requirements and the 
conditions your service will be operating in. … This approach allows the team making and 
operating the service to start small, learn fast, and provide value to users as soon as 
possible”(GDS 2018b). 
The BCS criteria also include other considerations that are explicitly addressed by Verify but 
which are often implicit or under discussed in national identity systems. Failure to address 
these issues explicitly typically results in them reappearing later in the process where their 
effects can be much more significant. Thus, the BCS asks Who pays? Who carries the can 
(liability)? and How well does the identity system work? 
Although the use of multiple identity providers is partly a function of the political decision 
that the UK government would not act as an identity provider, this approach encourages 
innovation in both verification and authentication activities. 
In most contexts, identity credentials are issued by a state monopoly service and, as such, 
can fail to be responsive changing user needs (Ciborra 2005). Because of the way in which 
the procurement framework for Verify has been configured identity providers have strong 
incentives to improve the user experience, reduce unnecessary costs and broaden the 
coverage of potential users who can verify their identity with them.  
Equally, the requirements for authentication are specified in terms of high level requirements 
and this again provides flexibility for identity providers to innovate through the use of, for 
example, apps and mobile phone fingerprint readers for local biometric checks. 
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The federated architecture is also a privacy–enhancing feature and this may be important for 
contexts where national identity systems are uncommon or where levels of distrust in 
government are high. 
Federated architectures also minimise the risks associated with holding all identity data in a 
single entity, where the consequences of a data breach can be significant (e.g., Leyden 2016a, 
2016b, 2016c; Thomson 2015). 
5. Using Open Standards and Ensuring Vendor and Technology 
Neutrality 
A recent Parliamentary report has described the UK government’s overall record in 
developing and implementing new systems as “appalling” (Public Administration Select 
Committee 2011) with the problems arising from two main factors: a lack of technology 
skills in government and an over–reliance on “contracting out” technology to a limited 
number of suppliers (Institute for Government 2011). 
In many cases, Government outsourcing activities resulted in bespoke systems that 
effectively lock–in government to a small number of suppliers. This is particularly perplexing 
given that many of the services offered by government whilst large (population) scale are 
actually fairly standard commodity items that could be procured from the open market. 
Verify therefore focuses specifically on open standards and does everything it can to 
minimise the risks of vendor and technology lock–in. Thus, the certified companies are 
expected to offer identity proofing and authentication services to the standard of GPG45 
rather than specific technological fixes. Similarly, there are specific provisions around the 
role and scope of the material sub–contractors that seek to ensure that despite an apparent 
marketplace in certified companies they are not all reliant on a small number of companies 
to provide key aspects of the identity proofing process (GOV.UK Verify 2014i). 
Another example of how Verify is moving towards vendor neutrality can be seen from the 
case where Verizon was dropped as a certified company (Merrett 2016c). As the government 
had a marketplace of identity providers, it demonstrated that it was not reliant on particular 
vendors. Additionally, the form of the contracts that the identity providers sign as part of the 
framework agreement (GOV.UK Verify 2014e) mean that prices are stable over the period 
of the agreement. 
6. Protecting User Privacy and Control through System Design 
The new EU GDPR requires that companies design privacy compliant policies, procedures 
and systems from the outset. However, there is also widespread recognition that it is costly 
to bolt privacy protections onto an existing system. It therefore makes sense, particularly 
when moving towards new digital identity systems, to include privacy considerations 
throughout the development process. This involves consideration of technological decisions 
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about what data to collect and share as well as the legal environment within which the 
identity system operates (Nyst et al. 2016). 
As Verify is a brand-new system that has been designed and built from scratch, it is based on 
a privacy enhancing architecture. In other contexts, building on existing legacy systems, 
possible changes to the architecture may be more constrained unless the move to a digital 
identity also involves a more fundamental business process transformation as well. 
Privacy–by–design goes beyond the technical architecture and Verify provides an exemplar 
for how privacy principles can be used to shape the norms associated with a digital identity 
system, including how privacy principles can be embedded into contractual considerations 
with providers of identity services. 
Finally, the role of PCAG in the overall governance of the Verify scheme is worth noting. As 
well as developing the privacy principles PCAG illustrates how a government service can 
engage effectively with independent privacy experts and consumer advocates. 
7. Planning for Financial and Operational Sustainability without 
Compromising Accessibility 
In many cases, the funding and charging for identity systems is unclear. Is the identity system 
a basic part of the nation’s infrastructure that should be paid for by centrally, or is it 
providing a service that should be funded, at least in part, by the service’s “users” (and if so, 
are the “users” the individuals who are accessing government services or the government 
services who are consuming the identities?). 
In the case of Verify, as the business case (GOV.UK Verify 2015d) indicates, Verify is partly 
paid for centrally and partly by the government services consuming the identities. Verify is 
seen as a key part of the government’s infrastructure and, as such, is supported centrally. 
Moreover, it seeks to avoid unnecessary duplication in terms of government procurement by 
having GDS as the sole contracting authority for identity related services. This also helps the 
user experience as they only have to provide their identity evidence package once before 
using Verify on a range of services. 
Verify charges government services providers who will use Verify’d identities a fixed fee for 
the number of identities they interact with per year (GOV.UK Verify 2017d, sec. 4) rather 
than on a per–transaction basis. This will help ensure that proper authentication (and back–
end ongoing identity proofing) takes place on all transactions as there is no additional cost to 
using Verify throughout the year. 
8. Safeguarding Data Privacy, Security, and User Rights through a 
Comprehensive Legal and Regulatory Framework 
As is discussed above, a key feature of Verify was its explicit consideration of privacy and 
consumer rights in terms of the system’s technical architecture and governance approach, 
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e.g., the PCAG identity assurance principles. Verify operates in the context of the UK’s Data 
Protection Act and the EU GDPR. It also operates in a legal environment where contractual 
arrangements (e.g., between government and the certified companies) are strongly enforced 
and user data protection rights are overseen by the Information Commissioner’s office. 
9. Establishing Clear Institutional Mandates and Accountability 
The institutional mandates for Verify can be found across a range of government policy 
documents, ranging from the election manifesto of the current government (Conservative 
Party 2017) to the UK digital strategy (GOV.UK 2017b). These documents provide clear 
support for Verify as the identity solution for accessing UK government services online as 
well as presenting Verify for use by private sector organisations as well. 
The discussion of Verify’s governance arrangements in Section D provides information 
about the oversight and accountability for Verify, for example, demonstrating how security 
considerations for Verify feed into pan government security accreditation.  
10. Enforcing Legal and Trust Frameworks though Independent 
Oversight and Adjudication of Grievances 
Given the central role of the user experience in Verify, a key feature of the PCAG principles 
relates to dispute resolution. If users face problems, for example in obtaining a Verify’d 
identity or in accessing an online government service, it is important that they know where 
they can go to get support. In the first instance this is likely to be with the certified company 
they are using to provide their Verify’d identity. However, in some cases they may want to 
contact the Verify team directly or even the government department whose service they are 
trying to access. 
Functional? Foundational? What Verify Is and Isn’t 
Gelb and Clark (2013) distinguish between foundational and functional identity systems. 
Foundational identity systems are typically those based on core identity systems such as civil 
registration systems and national identity card systems. Functional identity systems, in 
contrast, are typically created for specific (functional) purposes such as voting, health 
insurance etc. In some cases, foundational systems can be used for functional purposes but 
all too often they sit alongside (and replicate) functional systems resulting in unnecessary 
duplication of effort and a poor user experience. On this basis, Verify is closer to a 
foundational identity system than a functional one. In particular, the Verify once, use often 
approach allows the same (now foundational?) Verify’d identity to be used for a growing 
range of functions. 
The work that Verify is undertaking with, for example, local authorities helps highlight the 
relationship between a Verify’d identity and the attributes needed for many functional 
systems. For example, concessionary travel for elderly people needs only to be based on 
attributes of an individual (are they old enough to be entitled to the concessionary travel?) 
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rather than their identity per se. Other attributes that enable important functional systems 
might include citizenship, eligibility to vote, low income status or “settled status” for EU 
citizens post BREXIT (GOV.UK 2017e). 
There are clear savings to be made, however, by linking these attributes to a Verify’d identity 
(or equivalent foundational identity) rather than seeking to build functional systems around 
their own identity evidence. 
Foundational systems are often derived from civil registry data and, in many economies, the 
birth registration record is the basis of the identity credential. In the case of Verify, civil 
registration data can form the basis of a Verify’d identity, but the identity proofing and 
verification standards used allow for alternative identity evidence to be used instead. As 
noted above, this is partly because of the proactive anti–fraud processes associated with 
identity verification, given the relatively high levels of assurance required by Verify. 
Additionally, because Verify is about enabling access to online government services, there is 
an explicit need to allow residents to be able to access these services alongside citizens. That 
is, an identity system should be built for everyone in a nation rather than being a system for 
nationals. Data about residents, as opposed to citizens, is unlikely to be found in national 
civil registration systems and so, on this basis Verify appears to be less of a foundational 
system. 
Another way of considering what Verify is and isn’t relates to the notion of legal identity, a 
key feature of UN Sustainable Development Goal 16.9 (“provide legal identity for all, 
including birth registration”). This ambiguous goal (Whitley and Manby 2015) highlights the 
importance of birth registration (one kind of identity evidence for Verify) in relation to the 
nebulous notion of “legal identity.” In the context of access to online government services, 
however, a Verify’d identity satisfies a functional interpretation of legal identity, namely an 
identity that is recognised as being of sufficient quality to access online government services, 
i.e., a legally operational identity (LOID) (cf BCS Identity Assurance Working Group 2016). 
Moreover, a LoA2 Verify’d identity not just acceptable for operational purposes it is also 
based on identity evidence that satisfies the standards required for civil legal proceedings. 
This suggests, in a manner analogous to the BCS evaluation of good identity systems, 
shifting the debate from what an identity is to the conditions that determine when and how 
an identity can used for real world transactions. 
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G. Appendices 
Appendix 1. Glossary and Abbreviations 
A/B Testing: A process whereby users are randomly shown alternative (A or B) interfaces or 
user experiences and the levels of user satisfaction are measured. This helps refine the best 
interface/user experience 
API: Application Programming Interfaces are standards that allow software components to 
interact and exchange data without needing full access to the underlying data sources 
Authentication: This is the process of asserting an identity previously established 
during identification 
Certified companies: These are the companies that have a contractual agreement with 
GOV.UK Verify to provide identity assurance services. They must be members of an 
accredited Scheme (t–Scheme) and have successfully completed a rigorous onboarding 
process. Currently these are Barclays, CitizenSafe, Digidentity, Experian, Post Office, Royal 
Mail and SecureIdentity 
DEFRA: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Handles Common 
Agricultural Policy information service and other rural payments 
DVLA: Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency. Handles all driving licence information 
DVSA Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency. Administers driving tests, approves driving 
instructors and MOT testers. 
DWP: Department of Work and Pensions. Responsible for pensions and other social welfare 
payments 
Government Service Provider: The government departments that act as relying parties for 
Verify. Currently they are DEFRA, DVLA, DVSA, DWP, HM Land Registry, HM Revenue 
and Customs, Home Office and the Insolvency Service 
GPG: Good Practice Guide 
GDPR: General Data Protection Regulation 
GDS: Government Digital Service 
HMRC: HM Revenue and Customs. Responsible for tax, payments and customs activities 
Hub: Privacy enhancing feature of the Verify architecture that sits between identity providers 
and service providers 
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Identity evidence package: A set of identity evidence presented in support of a claimed 
identity 
Identity evidence profile: Scoring of the identity evidence package against the Identity 
Proofing and Verification standards 
Identity proofing and verification: The process of assuring the identity claims made by an 
individual 
Identity providers: A more general term for the certified companies  
KYC: “Know your customer.” The identity proofing and verification checks required, 
typically, when opening a bank or financial product account 
Level of Assurance: The assurance associated with a particular Verify’d identity. Most 
services currently using Verify currently use an LoA2 Verify’d identity.  
LoA: Level of Assurance 
Matching data service: The service that matches the matching data set sent from the Hub 
with the records held by the service provider 
Matching data set: A minimal set of personal data used by the matching data service. The 
data set consists of full name, address, date of birth, optionally gender, history of attributes 
and the associated assertion of level of assurance (currently only LoA2) 
Relying party: A more general term for Service Providers 
SAML: Security Assertion Markup Language. An open standard data format for exchanging 
authentication and authorization data between parties. It is based on XML the extensible 
markup language 
SIRO: Senior Information Risk Owner 
User: The data subject about whom identity claims relate 
Verify model: The four distinctive features of Verify: A risk- and standards-based approach 
to identity verification and authentication; A federated architecture involving multiple identity 
providers that encourages innovation in both verification and authentication activities; A 
privacy–by–design approach that embeds privacy principles in contracts and norms and 
includes expert oversight of privacy and consumer issues; and A user focussed service delivery 
approach that includes an emphasis on transparency and engagement with all relevant 
stakeholders 
Verify’d identity: An identity that has satisfied the identity proofing and verification 
standards, for example, to LoA2 
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Appendix 2. Historical Background to Verify 
This section draws on (Whitley et al. 2014; Whitley and Hosein 2010a). 
According to Agar (2005), the first ever attempt at a national identity card and population 
register in the UK was a failure. The programme was introduced during the First World War 
as a means of determining the extent of the male population in the country. Existing 
government records were considered incomplete and ineffective for the purposes of 
developing a policy for conscription. Once the count was completed and the government 
knew how many men were available to serve, political interest in national registration and 
identification cards waned and the system was soon abandoned. 
However, as Agar notes, the promise of a national identification system was not forgotten by 
the civil service, who during the Second World War re–introduced the idea of identity cards, 
primarily as a way of identifying aliens and managing the allocation of food rations. 
Crucial to the operation of the second National Register was its intimate 
connection to the organisation of food rationing. In order to renew a ration 
book, an identity card would have to be produced for inspection at a local 
office at regular intervals. Those without an identity card, would within a 
short period of time no longer be able, legally, to claim rationed food. This 
intimate connection between two immense administrative systems was vital 
to the success of the second card—they were not forgotten by members of 
the public—and provides one of the main historical lessons (Agar 2005). 
 
As identity cards became a facet of everyday life, they started being used for additional 
purposes (i.e., they were subject to ‘function creep’), including identity checks by police 
officers. This use continued even after the war was over. Liberal–minded citizens eventually 
began to question these practices and, in 1950, one such citizen, Clarence Willcock, disputed 
the police’s routine check of identity cards. Willcock’s legal challenges were not successful, 
but in the case’s written judgment Lord Goddard (the Lord Chief Justice) criticised the 
police for abusing identity cards. By 1952 Parliament had repealed the legislative basis for the 
national identity card and it disappeared from use. 
As many observers have noted since that time the civil service and politicians have been 
regularly captivated by the idea of re–introducing national identity cards in the UK, with the 
aim of solving a diversity of policy problems, ranging from streamlining tax administration 
to ‘fixing’ the immigration ‘problem’, among others. By the early 2000s they had tried again. 
In 2002, the Labour government, under Prime Minister Tony Blair and with David Blunkett 
serving as Home Secretary, proposed a new national ‘entitlement card’ scheme. This 
proposal was then re–branded as a national ‘identity card’ scheme in 2004. Following the 
2005 general election in the UK (in which the Labour party was again re–elected to 
government) the updated proposals were introduced to Parliament in the form of a National 
Identity Scheme. 
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In June 2005, a research group based at the London School of Economics (which the author 
of this report was an integral part of) issued a detailed report that critically analysed the 
government’s proposals (LSE Identity Project 2005). The LSE researchers suggested that the 
likely cost of the Scheme was far higher than government estimates, evaluated the likely 
technology solutions and the likely challenges in deploying these technologies and identified 
focal points around the policy that would likely give rise to privacy and surveillance 
concerns. This led to widespread, mostly negative, media coverage of the proposed scheme 
(Pieri 2009) around these lines of criticism and most notably the costs of the scheme; while 
the Parliamentary debate was fuelled by data and analyses from the LSE report (Whitley 
2014). 
Despite these concerns, Parliament passed the Identity Cards Act 2006 on 30 March, thus 
enabling the first national identity card programme in the UK since World War II. 
This new Scheme was different from previous ones in several important ways. The proposals 
called for a system of unprecedented size for that time and complexity, comprising a 
centralised National Identity Register (the electronic database on which the population’s 
identity data would be held) and the collection and recording of over 50 pieces of personal 
information from individuals, including most notably the collection and use of the biometric 
information of UK citizens and residents both for enrolment (to ensure that no individual 
was entered onto the Register more than once) and verification, the proposed use of a single 
identification number across government and the private sector (Otjacques et al. 2007) and 
an ‘audit trail’ that was expected to record details of every instance that an identity was 
verified against information stored on the Register.2 
Even once Parliament had formally approved the Scheme and created the new Identity and 
Passport Service from the previous Passport Agency, the government’s plans did not run 
smoothly. In July 2006, leaked e–mails from senior civil servants warning about ongoing 
risks to the Scheme were published on the front page of a major newspaper (The Sunday 
Times 2006a, 2006b). Shortly thereafter, the new Home Secretary (the third in as many years 
and the third overseeing this policy) ordered a wholesale review of the plans for the Scheme 
given worries that many parts of his department were “not fit for purpose.” This review 
resulted in the Strategic Action Plan issued in December 2006 (UKIPS 2006) that sought to 
reduce the risks, and costs, of the Scheme. 
Another significant event that affected the government’s plans was the announcement by the 
then Chancellor Alistair Darling, on 20 November 2007, that a data breach involving 
“personal data relating to child benefit” had arisen in HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
[Hansard 20 November 2007: Column 1101–]. On 18 October 2007, in response to a 
request from the National Audit Office (NAO) for data in relation to payment of child 
benefit, a civil servant at HMRC sent a full copy of the data on two password–protected 
compact discs, using an obsolete version of compression software with weak encryption. 
                                                     
2 This requirement for a personal audit trail would prove to be particularly controversial amongst activists, who 
viewed it as a dangerous surveillance device. 
77 
The discs were sent using the HMRC’s internal mail service, operated by TNT. The package 
was not recorded or registered and failed to arrive at the NAO. When the requested discs 
did not arrive, a second set of discs was sent, this time by recorded delivery. These did arrive. 
The discs, containing details of all child benefit recipients—records for 25 million individuals 
and 7.25 million families—have still not been recovered. The records included the names of 
recipients as well as their children, address details and dates of birth, child benefit numbers, 
national insurance numbers and, where relevant, bank or building society account details. 
Unsurprisingly, public trust in the government’s ability to keep personal data secure was 
negatively affected by this news and the implications for the National Identity Scheme were 
widely reported. Surveys by campaign groups opposed to identity cards, as well as those 
organised by the Home Office, demonstrated falling levels of trust in the government’s plans 
to implement identity cards. 
In the run–up to the 2010 general election, opposition parties in the UK began to articulate 
the basis of their concerns with the government’s identity policy, as embodied in the 
National Identity Scheme and to build on the falling support for the government’s plans. For 
the Conservative Party, the identity card scheme became part of a broader narrative that 
presented the government’s policy as creating a surveillance state, a policy that needed to be 
reversed (Conservatives 2009). This reversal began with the belief that personal information 
belongs to the citizen—not the state—and where government collects private details, they 
are held on trust. As a result, the Conservative Party’s logic was that the government must be 
held accountable to its citizens, not the other way around (Conservatives 2009). 
In their 2010 election manifesto, this goal of introducing measures “to protect personal 
privacy and hold government to account” became an espoused part of the Conservative 
Party policy agenda, under the heading “Protect our freedoms”: 
Labour’s approach to our personal privacy is the worst of all worlds—
intrusive, ineffective and enormously expensive. We will scrap ID cards, the 
National Identity Register and the Contactpoint database (Conservative 
Party 2010). 
 
The third major political party, the Liberal Democrats, also reiterated its longstanding 
opposition to identity cards. Their manifesto noted that: 
increasing use of sophisticated technology, whilst bringing undoubted 
benefits to society, also poses new threats to individual liberty, particularly 
in relation to Identity Cards. The Liberal Party opposes the introduction of 
any form of national Identity Card, whether voluntary or compulsory 
(Liberal Democrats 2010). 
 
By the time of the general election, every political party other than the Labour party had 
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included proposals to scrap identity cards as part of their election manifestos (Whitley and 
Hosein 2010b). 
In the 2010 election, no single party won an overall majority and, after a period of 
negotiation and speculation about whether one party might try to operate a minority 
government, a coalition between the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties was 
announced. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a key feature of the joint ‘Coalition Agreement’, 
announced on 11 May 2010, was plans: 
to implement a full programme of measures to reverse the substantial 
erosion of civil liberties under the Labour Government and roll back state 
intrusion. 
This will include: 
* A Freedom or Great Repeal Bill 
* The scrapping of ID card scheme, the National Identity register, the next 
generation of biometric passports and the Contact Point Database 
(Conservative Liberal Democrat coalition negotiations 2010). 
 
The first piece of legislation introduced by the new Coalition Government (“Bill 1 of 2010–
11”) was the “Identity Documents Bill,” which was “A Bill to make provision for and in 
connection with the repeal of the Identity Cards Act 2006.” Passage of the Bill took longer 
than the government had anticipated partly because of counter proposals made by the 
Labour Party to compensate those citizens who had paid for identity cards that were about 
to be revoked. The Bill received Royal Assent on 21 December 2010, at which point the 
identity cards ceased to have legal status. On 10 February 2011, Home Office minister 
Damian Green marked the end of the identity card scheme by feeding its drives into an 
industrial shredder in Essex (Mathieson 2013). 
While scrapping the unloved National Identity Scheme and even physically grinding to dust 
key hardware components of the system, provides an important symbolic moment in the 
short history of this identity policy, it did not resolve questions of how individuals can 
feasibly identify themselves in order to gain access to services. The challenge of an effective 
identity policy did not go away with a new government. In particular, government services 
still needed to have confidence in the people they are interacting with and citizens need to 
have trust in the identity system they must to use to interact with government. 
For many years, identity verification in the UK has been based on a rather haphazard mix of 
official documents with passports and driving licences being used to confirm someone’s 
name and utility bills or existence on the electoral roll being used to confirm address details. 
Although some checking services exist, for example, a commercial passport verification 
service or using the utility meter reference number on the utility bill to compare the address 
of the meter with the claimed address on the bill, these were rarely used. Indeed, even a 
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former Attorney General was caught out (and fined) over incomplete identity checks and 
record keeping (Bingham and Prince 2009). 
This approach was particularly susceptible risks of compromised breeder documents feeding 
the whole process (Collings 2008). Moreover, it was hardly conducive to Government’s 
intention to move many services online and operate them securely and it is from this context 
that the Verify model emerged.  
80 
H. References 
All URLs checked 4 July 2018. 
  
Abraham, R., Bennett, E. S., Sen, N., and Shah, N. B. (2017). State of Aadhaar Report 2016-
17, IDInsight (available at http://stateofaadhaar.in/wp-content/uploads/State-of-
Aadhaar-Full-Report-2016-17-IDinsight.pdf). 
Agar, J. (2005). Identity cards in Britain: past experience and policy implications, History and 
Policy (available at http://www.historyandpolicy.org/papers/policy-paper-33.html). 
Ashford, W. (2015). Experian chooses UK authentication startup for GOV.UK Verify, 
Computer Weekly (available at 
http://www.computerweekly.com/news/4500260479/Experian-chooses-UK-
authentication-startup-for-GovUK-Verify). 
BBC News (2005). “Third” of DVLA car records wrong, (available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4214281.stm). 
BBC News (2016). Taxpayers turn to online returns, says HMRC, (available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-35458297). 
BCS Identity Assurance Working Group (2016). Aspects of Identity Yearbook 2015-16: 
How to recognise a good online identity scheme, (available at 
https://policy.bcs.org/sites/policy.bcs.org/files/Aspects%20of%20Identity_2015-
16_A4%204pp_WEB.pdf). 
Berghel, H. (2006). Fungible credentials and next-generation fraud, Communications of the Acm 
49(12), 15–19. 
Bicknell, D. (2016a). Cunnington: GDS strategy expected to be out by Christmas, Government 
Computing Network (available at http://central-
government.governmentcomputing.com/news/cunnington-gds-strategy-expected-to-be-
out-by-christmas-5038513). 
Bicknell, D. (2016b). Verify delays stall Britain’s progress on digital government, Euro report 
finds, Government Computing Network (available at http://central-
government.governmentcomputing.com/news/verify-delays-stall-britains-progress-on-
digital-government-euro-report-finds-5022064). 
Bicknell, D. (2017). HMRC opens up on Government Gateway and identity plans, 
Government Computing Network (available at http://central-
government.governmentcomputing.com/news/hmrc-opens-up-on-government-
gateway-and-identity-plans-5739073). 
Bingham, J., and Prince, R. (2009). Attorney General Baroness Scotland fined £5,000 over 
illegal immigrant housekeeper, Daily Telegraph (available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/6217586/Attorney-General-Baroness-
Scotland-fined-5000-over-illegal-immigrant-housekeeper.html). 
Blackhurst, C. (1993). A third of driving licences incorrect: Wrong DVLA data “wasting 
police time,” The Independent (available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/a-
third-of-driving-licences-incorrect-wrong-dvla-data-wasting-police-time-1469036.html). 
Brandão, L. T. A. N., Christin, N., Danezis, G., and Anonymous (2015). Toward Mending 
Two Nation-Scale Brokered Identification Systems, in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies 2015 (Vol. 2), 1–22. 
81 
Brown, A., Fishenden, J., Thompson, M., and Venters, W. (2017). Appraising the impact and 
role of platform models and Government as a Platform (GaaP) in UK Government 
public service reform: Towards a Platform Assessment Framework (PAF), Government 
Information Quarterly 34(2), 167–182. 
Brown, G. (2006). Chancellor appoints Sir James Crosby to lead Public Private Forum on 
Identity, (available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/press_51_06.htm). 
Burton, G. (2017a). HMRC denies reports it plans to develop its own authentication system 
and dump GOV.UK Verify, Computing.co.uk (available at 
http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/3004690/hmrc-denies-reports-it-plans-to-
develop-its-own-authentication-system-to-avoid-govuk-verify). 
Burton, G. (2017b). HMRC confirms plans to develop its own authentication service rather 
than use GOV.UK Verify, (available at 
http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/3004616/hmrc-confirms-plans-to-develop-its-
own-authentication-service-rather-than-use-govuk-verify). 
Cameron, K. (2005). The laws of identity, (available at 
http://www.identityblog.com/stories/2005/05/13/TheLawsOfIdentity.pdf). 
Cellan-Jones, R. (2017). Whitehall’s identity crisis: HMRC and Verify, (available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-38979144). 
Chirgwin, R. (2016). US standards lab says SMS is no good for authentication, The Register 
(available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/24/nist_says_sms_no_good_for_authentication
/). 
Ciborra, C. U. (2005). Interpreting e-government and development: Efficiency, transparency 
or governance at a distance?, Information Technology and People 18(3), 260–279. 
Collings, T. (2008). Some thoughts on the underlying logic and process underpinning 
Electronic Identity (e-ID), Information security technical report 13(2), 61–70. 
Conservative Liberal Democrat coalition negotiations (2010). Agreements reached, (available 
at 
http://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Downloadable%20Files/agreement.ash
x?dl=true). 
Conservative Party (2010). Manifesto: Invitation to join the government of Britain, (available 
at https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Manifesto2010). 
Conservative Party (2017). The Conservative Party Manifesto 2017, (available at 
https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto). 
Conservatives (2009). Reversing the rise of the surveillance state: 11 Measures to Protect 
Personal Privacy and Hold Government to Account, (available at 
http://www.conservatives.com/News/News_stories/2009/09/Reversing_the_rise_of_
the_surveillance_state.aspx). 
Crown Commercial Services (2016). Guidance on Framework Agreements, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4303
13/public-contracts-regulations-guidance.pdf). 
Currah, P., and Mulqueen, T. (2011). Securitizing gender: Identity, biometrics and 
transgender bodies at the airport, Social research 78(2), 557–582. 
82 
Curren, L., and Kaye, J. (2010). Revoking consent: A “blind spot” in data protection law?, 
Computer Law & Security Review 26(3), 273–283. 
Dale, K. (2016). GOV.UK Verify - estimating demographic coverage v1.1, (available at 
http://kyrandale.com/static/clients/gds/app/index.html). 
Dale, K. (2017). GOV.UK Verify - estimating demographic coverage v2.1, (available at 
http://kyrandale.com/static/clients/gds/app/verify-survey.html). 
Easton, S. (2016). National digital identity framework prototype only weeks away, The 
Mandarin (available at http://www.themandarin.com.au/68619-national-digital-identity-
framework-prototype-only-weeks-away/). 
European Commission (2016). Trust Services and eID - eIDAS, (available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/trust-services-and-eid). 
Evenstad, L. (2016a). GDS loses another senior exec with departure of Gov.uk Verify’s 
Janet Hughes, Computer Weekly (available at 
http://www.computerweekly.com/news/450302605/GDS-loses-another-senior-exec-
with-departure-of-Govuk-Verifys-Janet-Hughes). 
Evenstad, L. (2016b). Will Whitehall power struggle cripple Government Digital Service?, 
Computer Weekly (available at http://www.computerweekly.com/news/450301805/Will-
Whitehall-power-struggle-cripple-Government-Digital-Service). 
Fishenden, J. (2017). GOV.UK Verify and identity assurance - it’s time for a rethink, 
Computer Weekly (available at http://www.computerweekly.com/opinion/Govuk-Verify-
and-identity-assurance-its-time-for-a-rethink). 
Fiveash, K. (2014). Pitchforks at dawn! UK gov’s Verify ID service FAILS to verify ID, 
(available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/11/02/gov_uk_verify_id_assurance_experian_defr
a_test_failure/). 
Fiveash, K. (2017). HMRC gingerly rows back on GDS Verify identity system snub, Ars 
Technica (available at https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/02/hmrc-gds-verify-
government-gateway-identity/). 
Gal, U. (2016). Data surveillance is all around us, and it’s going to change our behaviour, The 
Conversation (available at http://theconversation.com/data-surveillance-is-all-around-us-
and-its-going-to-change-our-behaviour-65323). 
GDS (2016a). Using mob programming to solve a problem, (available at 
https://gds.blog.gov.uk/2016/09/01/using-mob-programming-to-solve-a-problem/). 
GDS (2016b). Welcoming our new minister, (available at 
https://gds.blog.gov.uk/2016/09/16/welcoming-our-new-minister/). 
GDS (2016c). Kevin says hello, (available at https://gds.blog.gov.uk/2016/08/04/kevin-
says-hello/). 
GDS (2016d). The GDS mission: support, enable and assure, (available at 
https://gds.blog.gov.uk/2016/10/26/the-gds-mission-support-enable-and-assure/). 
GDS (2016e). Introducing the GDS International team, (available at 
https://gds.blog.gov.uk/2016/08/23/introducing-the-gds-international-team/). 
GDS (2017a). Government Transformation Strategy, GDS (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-transformation-strategy-
2017-to-2020/government-transformation-strategy). 
83 
GDS (2017b). What you can learn from making data user-centred?, (available at 
https://gds.blog.gov.uk/2017/01/31/what-you-can-learn-from-making-data-user-
centred/). 
GDS (2017c). New minister pays a visit to GDS’s new HQ, (available at 
https://gds.blog.gov.uk/2017/06/28/new-minister-pays-a-visit-to-gdss-new-hq/). 
GDS (2017d). The Government Transformation Strategy 2017 to 2020, GDS (available at 
https://gds.blog.gov.uk/2017/02/09/the-government-transformation-strategy-2017-to-
2020/). 
GDS (2018a). Digital Service Standard - Digital Service Manual, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/service-manual/service-standard). 
GDS (2018b). Service design phases — Government Service Design Manual, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/service-manual/phases). 
GDS (2018c). Our governance - Government Digital Service, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/government-digital-
service/about/our-governance). 
Gelb, A., and Clark, J. (2013). Identification for Development: The Biometrics Revolution - 
Working Paper 315, Centre for Global Development (available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/publication/identification-development-biometrics-revolution-
working-paper-315). 
Gelb, A., and Diofasi, A. (2016). Biometric Elections in Poor Countries: Wasteful or a 
Worthwhile Investment? - Working Paper 435, Centre for Global Development (available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/publication/biometric-elections-poor-countries-wasteful-or-
worthwhile-investment). 
Gelb, A., and Manby, B. (2016). Has Development Converged with Human Rights? 
Implications for the Legal Identity SDG, Centre for Global Development (available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/blog/has-development-converged-human-rights-implications-
legal-identity-sdg). 
Glick, B. (2016a). DWP digital experts brought in to help assess plans for Government 
Digital Service, Computer Weekly (available at 
http://www.computerweekly.com/news/450302866/DWP-digital-experts-brought-in-
to-help-assess-plans-for-Government-Digital-Service). 
Glick, B. (2016b). Interview: Kevin Cunnington, director general, Government Digital 
Service, Computer Weekly (available at 
http://www.computerweekly.com/news/450401508/Interview-Kevin-Cunnington-
director-general-Government-Digital-Service). 
Glick, B. (2017a). GOV.UK Verify fails to meet key business case targets, Computer Weekly 
(available at http://www.computerweekly.com/news/450424217/Govuk-Verify-fails-
to-meet-key-business-case-targets). 
Glick, B. (2017b). GDS, HMRC and Verify: so much for cross-government digital 
collaboration, Computer Weekly (available at 
http://www.computerweekly.com/blog/Computer-Weekly-Editors-Blog/GDS-
HMRC-and-Verify-so-much-for-cross-government-digital-collaboration). 
Glick, B. (2017c). Ex-government privacy advisor calls for “fundamental review” of 
GOV.UK Verify identity scheme, Computer Weekly (available at 
84 
http://www.computerweekly.com/news/450418300/Ex-government-privacy-advisor-
calls-for-fundamental-review-of-Govuk-Verify-identity-scheme). 
GOV.UK (2012). Requirements for secure delivery of online public services, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/requirements-for-secure-delivery-of-
online-public-services). 
GOV.UK (2013). Identity assurance: organisation identity, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/identity-assurance-organisation-
identity). 
GOV.UK (2014). Authentication credentials for online government services, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/authentication-credentials-for-online-
government-services). 
GOV.UK (2015a). Spending review and autumn statement 2015 - GOV.UK, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/spending-review-and-autumn-
statement-2015-documents/spending-review-and-autumn-statement-2015). 
GOV.UK (2015b). Cabinet Office settlement at the Spending Review 2015 - Press releases, 
(available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cabinet-office-settlement-at-the-
spending-review-2015). 
GOV.UK (2015c). Buying goods and services: options for public sector buyers - Detailed 
guidance, (available at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/buying-goods-and-services-
options-for-public-sector-buyers). 
GOV.UK (2017a). Part 6. Digital government - maintaining the UK government as a world 
leader in serving its citizens online, UK Digital Strategy (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-digital-strategy/6-digital-
government-maintaining-the-uk-government-as-a-world-leader-in-serving-its-citizens-
online). 
GOV.UK (2017b). UK Digital Strategy, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-digital-strategy). 
GOV.UK (2017c). New Data Protection Bill: Our planned reforms, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/general-data-protection-regulation-
call-for-views). 
GOV.UK (2017d). The exchange and protection of personal data - a future partnership 
paper, (available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-exchange-and-
protection-of-personal-data-a-future-partnership-paper). 
GOV.UK (2017e). Safeguarding the position of EU citizens in the UK and UK nationals in 
the EU, (available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/safeguarding-the-
position-of-eu-citizens-in-the-uk-and-uk-nationals-in-the-eu). 
GOV.UK (2018a). Identity proofing and verification of an individual, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/identity-proofing-and-verification-of-
an-individual). 
GOV.UK (2018b). Government as a Platform, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/government-as-a-platform). 
GOV.UK (2018c). Change the address on your driving licence, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/change-address-driving-licence). 
GOV.UK Verify (2013a). Privacy and Consumer Advisory Group: Draft Identity Assurance 
Principles, (available at https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/draft-identity-
85 
assurance-principles/privacy-and-consumer-advisory-group-draft-identity-assurance-
principles). 
GOV.UK Verify (2013b). Identity Assurance Hub Service SAML 2.0 Profile, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/identity-assurance-hub-service-saml-20-
profile). 
GOV.UK Verify (2014a). Identity Assurance Principles, No. Version 3.1, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/3614
96/PCAG_IDA_Principles_3.1__4_.pdf). 
GOV.UK Verify (2014b). GOV.UK Verify: checks identity providers must perform - 
Detailed guidance, (available at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/govuk-verify-checks-
identity-providers-must-perform). 
GOV.UK Verify (2014c). GOV.UK Verify: IPV Operations Manual (redacted), No. 2.3.1, 
(available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/govuk-verify-ipv-
operations-manual-redacted). 
GOV.UK Verify (2014d). Identity assurance, procurement 2, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2014/04/04/identity-assurance-procurement-2/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2014e). EU Tender document, Services - 428146-2014 - TED Tenders 
Electronic Daily (available at http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:428146-
2014:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1). 
GOV.UK Verify (2014f). How we use open source code on the identity assurance 
programme, (available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2014/10/09/how-we-
use-open-source-code-on-the-identity-assurance-programme/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2014g). What we’re doing to help teams across government use GOV.UK 
Verify, (available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2014/11/19/what-were-
doing-to-help-teams-across-government-use-gov-uk-verify/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2014h). What it means to be a “certified company,” (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2014/12/11/what-it-means-to-be-a-certified-
company/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2014i). Making sure we have a range of certified companies, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2014/12/10/making-sure-we-have-a-range-of-
certified-companies/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2015a). Privacy and Consumer Advisory Group, Terms of Reference, 
(available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4481
01/IDA_Privacy_and_Consumer_Advisory_Group_-_ToR_PDF.pdf). 
GOV.UK Verify (2015b). Making GOV.UK Verify available to more people, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2015/10/20/making-gov-uk-verify-available-to-
more-people/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2015c). GOV.UK Verify Hub - privacy aspects, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2015/06/22/gov-uk-verify-hub-privacy-
aspects/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2015d). GOV.UK Verify Programme Business Case (Redacted),. 
GOV.UK Verify (2015e). Basic identity accounts trial | GOV.UK Verify, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2015/06/11/basic-identity-accounts-trial/). 
86 
GOV.UK Verify (2015f). Guest post by Lee Croucher: 3 things departments should know 
about joining GOV.UK Verify, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2015/12/04/guest-post-3-things-departments-
should-know-about-joining-gov-uk-verify/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2015g). GOV.UK Verify and Mydex CIC, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2015/03/25/gov-uk-verify-and-mydex/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2015h). Identity Assurance Hub Service Profile: Authentication Contexts, 
(available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/identity-assurance-hub-
service-profile-authentication-contexts). 
GOV.UK Verify (2015i). Identity Assurance Hub Service Profile: SAML Attributes, 
(available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/identity-assurance-hub-
service-profile-saml-attributes). 
GOV.UK Verify (2015j). The basis of trust for EU identity assurance, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2015/12/14/the-basis-of-trust-for-eu-identity-
assurance/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2015k). The EU approach to identity assurance: an update, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2015/11/20/the-eu-approach-to-identity-
assurance-an-update/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016a). How we introduce GOV.UK Verify, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/08/17/how-we-introduce-gov-uk-verify/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016b). Introducing our first #VerifyLocal pilot plans for local councils, 
(available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/09/08/introducing-our-first-
verifylocal-pilot-plans-for-local-councils/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016c). GOV.UK Verify: Technical delivery update, 12 July 2016, 
(available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/07/12/gov-uk-verify-technical-
delivery-update-12-july-2016/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016d). GOV.UK Verify: understanding who can be verified, (available at 
https://gds.blog.gov.uk/2016/01/25/gov-uk-verify-understanding-who-can-be-
verified/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016e). Can online activity history help GOV.UK Verify work for more 
people?, (available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/07/25/can-online-
activity-history-help-gov-uk-verify-work-for-more-people/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016f). Making GOV.UK Verify the default way to access digital services, 
(available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/03/14/making-gov-uk-verify-
the-default-way-to-access-digital-services/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016g). Estimating what proportion of the public will be able to use 
GOV.UK Verify, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/01/25/estimating-what-proportion-of-the-
public-will-be-able-to-use-gov-uk-verify/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016h). Improving GOV.UK Verify’s demographic coverage - an update, 
(available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/08/19/improving-gov-uk-
verifys-demographic-coverage-an-update/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016i). Accreditation and risk management in GOV.UK Verify, (available 
at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/04/04/accreditation-and-risk-
management-in-gov-uk-verify/). 
87 
GOV.UK Verify (2016j). Building GOV.UK Verify to Agile principles, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/06/03/building-gov-uk-verify-to-agile-
principles/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016k). Goals, cycles and people: running an agile, complex programme in 
government, (available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/03/11/goals-
cycles-and-people-running-an-agile-complex-programme-in-government/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016l). Meeting user needs, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/02/29/meeting-user-needs/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016m). GOV.UK Verify: Technical delivery update, 13 September 2016, 
(available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/09/13/gov-uk-verify-technical-
delivery-update-13-september-2016/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016n). 100 rounds of user research on GOV.UK Verify, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/08/02/100-rounds-of-user-research-on-
gov-uk-verify/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016o). Experimenting with mob programming to rebuild the GOV.UK 
Verify frontend, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/02/26/experimenting-with-mob-
programming-to-rebuild-the-gov-uk-verify-frontend/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016p). The technical team working together through group learning, 
(available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/09/16/the-technical-team-
working-together-through-group-learning/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016q). Releasing safe and useful code for GOV.UK Verify, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/04/07/releasing-safe-and-useful-code-for-
gov-uk-verify/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016r). Supporting Welsh language users of GOV.UK Verify / Cefnogi 
defnyddwyr GOV.UK Verify drwy gyfrwng y Gymraeg, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/04/08/supporting-welsh-language-users-
of-gov-uk-verify-cefnogi-defnyddwyr-gov-uk-verify-drwy-gyfrwng-y-gymraeg/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016s). GOV.UK Verify Onboarding Guide, (available at 
http://alphagov.github.io/identity-assurance-documentation/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016t). A lesson from GOV.UK Verify: blog your way towards live, 
(available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/07/14/a-lesson-from-gov-uk-
verify-blog-your-way-towards-live/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016u). GOV.UK Verify support: assisting users in their journey, 
(available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/09/01/gov-uk-verify-support-
assisting-users-in-their-journey/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016v). Privacy assessment in public beta, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/05/19/privacy-assessment-in-public-beta/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016w). GOV.UK Verify Data Protection Impact Assessment, (available 
at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/sites/36/2016/05/GOV-UK-Verify-DPIA-v1.0.pdf). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016x). A new phase for GOV.UK Verify, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/08/16/a-new-phase-for-gov-uk-verify/). 
88 
GOV.UK Verify (2016y). How we manage fraud and information security risk, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/01/18/how-we-manage-fraud-and-
information-security-risk/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016z). Planning for the event of GOV.UK Verify being taken 
temporarily offline, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/04/01/planning-for-the-event-of-gov-uk-
verify-being-taken-temporarily-offline/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016aa). GOV.UK Verify: Update on progress August 2016, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/08/22/gov-uk-verify-update-on-progress-
august-2016/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016ab). GOV.UK Verify for local government: working out loud, 
(available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/07/11/gov-uk-verify-for-local-
government-working-out-loud/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016ac). GOV.UK Verify for local government: outputs of our first 
discovery events, (available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/08/12/local-
government-outputs-of-our-first-discovery-events/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016ad). GOV.UK Verify / DVLA / local authority discovery day, 
(available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/07/15/gov-uk-verify-dvla-
local-authority-discovery-day/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016ae). A joined-up approach to improving service design with DVLA, 
(available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/09/05/a-joined-up-approach-
to-improving-service-design-with-dvla/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016af). #VerifyLocal pilots are open for business, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/10/03/verifylocal-pilots-are-open-for-
business/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016ag). Listening to the market: engaging with local authority suppliers, 
(available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/10/17/listening-to-the-market-
engaging-with-local-authority-suppliers/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016ah). Guest post: GOV.UK Verify, OIX and the future of banking, 
(available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/02/17/guest-post-gov-uk-
verify-oix-and-the-future-of-banking/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016ai). The value of digital identity to the financial sector, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/09/22/the-value-of-digital-identity-to-the-
financial-sector/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016aj). Government services using GOV.UK Verify - May 2016 update, 
(available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/05/25/government-services-
using-gov-uk-verify-may-2016-update/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2016ak). Improving GOV.UK Verify’s demographic coverage - an update 
on Northern Ireland, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2016/11/09/improving-gov-uk-verifys-
demographic-coverage-an-update-on-northern-ireland/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2017a). Growing Verify: services that need less proof of identity, (available 
at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2017/02/01/growing-verify-services-that-
need-less-proof-of-identity/). 
89 
GOV.UK Verify (2017b). Privacy and Consumer Advisory Group, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/privacy-and-consumer-advisory-group). 
GOV.UK Verify (2017c). How our certified companies support users to verify, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2017/03/30/how-our-certified-companies-
support-users-to-verify/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2017d). GOV.UK Verify Code of Interoperability, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/govuk-verify-code-of-interoperability). 
GOV.UK Verify (2017e). Creating test environments with the private sector, (available at 
https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2017/02/03/creating-test-environments-with-
the-private-sector/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2017f). The latest improvements across GOV.UK Verify’s certified 
companies, (available at https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk/2017/01/06/the-latest-
improvements-across-gov-uk-verifys-certified-companies/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2017g). About this guide — GOV.UK Verify Technical Guide 
documentation, (available at http://alphagov.github.io/rp-onboarding-tech-docs/). 
GOV.UK Verify (2018a). Introducing GOV.UK Verify, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/introducing-govuk-verify/introducing-
govuk-verify). 
GOV.UK Verify (2018b). Service dashboard, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/performance/govuk-verify). 
GOV.UK Verify (2018c). Account Use, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/performance/govuk-verify/users-accessing-services). 
GOV.UK Verify (2018d). Account use by week (existing users), (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/performance/govuk-verify/sign-in-by-week). 
Hall, K. (2016). Gov to pull plug on online ID verification portal Gateway in 2018, (available 
at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/05/13/plug_to_be_pulled_on_gateway_in_2018/). 
Head, B. (2016). Identity prominent in Australian security debate, Computer Weekly (available 
at http://www.computerweekly.com/news/450303746/Identity-prominent-in-
Australian-security-debate). 
HM Passport Office (2011). Basic passport checks, (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1187
83/basic-passport-checks.pdf). 
Institute for Government (2011). System error: Fixing the flaws in government IT, (available 
at 
http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/System%20
Error.pdf). 
Institute for Government (2016). Making a success of digital government, Institute for 
Government (available at 
http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publications/making-success-digital-
government). 
Leyden, J. (2016a). Did hacktivists really just expose half of Turkey’s entire population to ID 
theft?, The Register (available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/04/04/turkey_megaleak/). 
90 
Leyden, J. (2016b). Megabreach: 55 MILLION voters’ details leaked in Philippines, The 
Register (available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/04/07/philippine_voter_data_breach/). 
Leyden, J. (2016c). “No password” database error exposes info on 93 million Mexican 
voters, The Register (available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/04/25/mexico_voter_data_breach/). 
Liberal Democrats (2010). Manifesto 2010, (available at http://www.general-election-
2010.co.uk/2010-general-election-manifestos/Liberal-Democrat-Party-Manifesto-
2010.pdf). 
Lips, A. M. B., Taylor, J. A., and Organ, J. (2009). Identity management, administrative 
sorting and citizenship in new modes of government, Information, communication & society 
12(5), 715–734. 
Lips, M. B. (2013). Reconstructing, attributing and fixating citizen identities in digital-era 
government, Media, Culture & Society 35(1), 61–70. 
LSE Identity Project (2005). Main Report, (available at 
http://identityproject.lse.ac.uk/identityreport.pdf). 
Martin, A. K., and Whitley, E. A. (2013). Fixing identity? Biometrics and the tensions of 
material practices, Media, Culture and Society 35(1), 52–60. 
Mathieson, S. A. (2013). Card declined: how Britain said no to ID cards, three times over, CreateSpace 
London. 
McCluggage, W. (2011). ID Assurance Programme - Stakeholder and Communications 
Group (Privacy and Consumer (PC)), Email invitation to join PCAG sent to the author . 
Merrett, N. (2016a). Experian vows to expand GOV.UK Verify data sources, Government 
Computing Network (available at http://central-
government.governmentcomputing.com/news/experian-vows-to-expand-govuk-verify-
data-sources-4786830). 
Merrett, N. (2016b). PayPal withdraws from GOV.UK Verify, Government Computing Network 
(available at http://central-government.governmentcomputing.com/news/paypal-
withdraws-from-govuk-verify-4836965). 
Merrett, N. (2016c). Verizon “temporarily removed” as GOV.UK Verify ID provider, 
Government Computing Network (available at http://central-
government.governmentcomputing.com/news/verizon-temporarily-removed-as-govuk-
verify-id-provider-4955500). 
Merrett, N. (2016d). New GOV.UK Verify lead mulls devolution and NHS potential, 
Government Computing Network (available at http://central-
government.governmentcomputing.com/news/new-govuk-verify-lead-mulls-
devolution-and-nhs-potential-4985603). 
Merrett, N. (2016e). GDS lays down law on council Verify adoption criteria, (available at 
http://central-government.governmentcomputing.com/news/govuk-verify-to-
underpin-council-permit-transformation-pilots-5001712). 
Merrett, N. (2017a). HMRC reiterates Verify support beyond Gateway revamp, Government 
Computing Network (available at http://central-
government.governmentcomputing.com/news/hmrc-reiterates-verify-support-beyond-
gateway-revamp-5739628). 
91 
Merrett, N. (2017b). Pensions Dashboard prototype standards launched, Government 
Computing Network (available at http://central-
government.governmentcomputing.com/news/pensions-dashboard-prototype-
standards-launched-for-development-drive-5786151). 
Moss, D. (2016a). RIP IDA – are GDS talking to themselves?, (available at 
http://www.dmossesq.com/2016/04/rip-ida-are-gds-talking-to-themselves.html). 
Moss, D. (2016b). Matt Hancock: 83 + 83 = 71, (available at 
http://www.dmossesq.com/2016/06/matt-hancock-83-83-71.html). 
NAO (2016). Protecting information across government, National Audit Office (available at 
https://www.nao.org.uk/report/protecting-information-across-government/). 
NAO (2017). Digital Transformation in Government, National Audit Office (available at 
https://www.nao.org.uk/report/digital-transformation-in-government/). 
NCSC (2018). About Us, (available at https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/about-us). 
Nyst, C., Pannifer, S., Whitley, E. A., and Makin, P. (2016). Digital Identity: Issue analysis, 
No. PRJ.1578, , Consult Hyperion for Omidyar Network (available at 
http://www.chyp.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/PRJ.1578-Digital-Identity-Issue-
Analysis-Report-v1_6-1.pdf). 
OECD (1980). Guidelines: On the Protection of Privacy and Transborder of Personal Data, 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.htm
l). 
OIXUK (2016a). JustGiving and GOV.UK Verify: Exploring JustGiving information as part 
of the GOV.UK Verify process, (available at 
http://oixuk.org/blog/2016/05/28/justgiving-and-gov-uk-verify/). 
OIXUK (2016b). Verify Sandbox Environment, (available at 
http://oixuk.org/blog/2016/12/13/verify-sandbox-environment/). 
OIXUK (2016c). UK private sector needs for identity assurance, (available at 
http://oixuk.org/blog/2016/06/28/uk-private-sector-needs-for-identity-assurance/). 
OIXUK (2017a). Micro Sources of Data Aggregators, OIXUK (available at 
http://oixuk.org/blog/2017/02/21/micro-sources-of-data-aggregators/). 
OIXUK (2017b). Achieving Frictionless Customer Onboarding, (available at 
http://oixuk.org/blog/2017/07/03/achieving-frictionless-customer-onboarding/). 
OIXUK (2018). Published Papers – OIX – Open Identity Exchange, (available at 
http://oixuk.org/papers/). 
OPSI (1998). Data Protection Act 1998, (available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/ukpga_19980029_en_1). 
OPSI (2018). Data Protection Act 2018, Text, (available at 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/contents). 
Orlikowski, W. J. (2000). Using Technology and Constituting Structures: A Practice Lens for 
Studying Technology in organizations, Organizational Science 11(4), 404–428. 
Orlowski, A. (2015). Silicon Valley now “illegal” in Europe: Why Schrems vs Facebook is 
such a biggie, (available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/10/06/silicon_valley_after_max_schrems_safe_har
bour_facebook_google_analysis/). 
92 
Otjacques, B., Hitzelberger, P., and Feltz, F. (2007). Interoperability of E-Government 
Information Systems: Issues of Identification and Data Sharing, Journal of management 
information systems 23(4), 29–52. 
Parliament (2010). House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 16 Jun 2010 (pt 0003), 
(available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm100616/text/1006
16w0003.htm). 
Parliament (2016). Statutory Instruments, UK Parliament (available at 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06509). 
Pauli, D. (2016). Standards body warned SMS 2FA is insecure and nobody listened, The 
Register (available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/12/06/2fa_missed_warning/). 
Pieri, E. (2009). ID cards: A snapshot of the debate in the UK press, ESRC National Centre 
for e-Social Science (available at 
https://danishbiometrics.files.wordpress.com/2009/08/pieri_idcards_full_report.pdf). 
Public Administration Select Committee (2011). Government and IT- “A Recipe For Rip-
Offs”: Time For A New Approach, (available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubadm/715/715i.
pdf). 
Reuters, T. (2016). 3 priorities for managing KYC and on-boarding challenge, (available at 
http://blog.financial.thomsonreuters.com/3-priorities-for-managing-kyc-and-on-
boarding-challenge/). 
Schonberg, A. (2016). GB Group’s shares fall on sluggish GOV.UK Verify roll-out, 
DigitalLook (available at http://www.digitallook.com/news/aim-bulletin/gb-groups-
shares-fall-on-sluggish-govuk-verify-roll-out--1771884.html). 
Sir James Crosby (2008). Challenges and opportunities in identity assurance, HM Treasury 
(available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120906144256/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/identity_assurance060308.pdf). 
Strasburger, L. P. (2016). Investigatory Powers Bill: A force for good – if done right?, The 
Register (available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/01/11/strasburger_on_draft_investigatory_powers
_bill/). 
The Sunday Times (2006a). ID Cards doomed, say officials, London. 
The Sunday Times (2006b). Emails from Whitehall officials in charge of ID Cards, London 
(available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090415101745/http://www.ips.gov.uk/id
entity/downloads/foi/3905_URN_129.pdf). 
Thomson, I. (2014). Feds dig up law from 1789 to demand Apple, Google decrypt 
smartphones, slabs, The Register (available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/01/feds_turn_to_1789_law_to_force_smartph
one_makers_to_decrypt_handsets/). 
Thomson, I. (2015). SIX MILLION fingerprints of US govt workers nicked in cyber-heist, 
The Register (available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/09/23/opm_loses_millions_more_fingerprints/). 
93 
Tsakalakis, N., Stalla-Bourdillon, S., and O’Hara, K. (2017). Identity Assurance in the UK: 
technical implementation and legal implications under eIDAS, The Journal of Web Science 
3(3), 32–46. 
tScheme (2017). tScheme Website, (available at http://www.tscheme.org/). 
UKAuthority.com (2016). Verify can work in private sector, says OIX chief, UKAuthority.com 
(available at http://www.ukauthority.com/news/6289/verify-can-work-in-private-
sector-says-oix-chief). 
UKIPS (2006). Strategic Action Plan for the National Identity Scheme: Safe guarding your 
identity, (available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090415101316/http://www.ips.gov.uk/id
entity/downloads/Strategic-Action-Plan.pdf). 
Veridu (2016). The use of online activity in identity verification: A summary of our recent 
experience of working with the Government Digital Service (GDS) and the Open 
Identity Exchange (OIX) on a research project related to GOV.UK Verify., Medium 
(available at https://medium.com/@VeriduHQ/the-use-of-online-activity-in-identity-
verification-87443401834c#.izv7mkcj5). 
Virgo, P. (2016). Now that Verify has lost its head, will the corpse be decently buried? - 
When IT Meets Politics, Computer Weekly (available at 
http://www.computerweekly.com/blog/When-IT-Meets-Politics/Now-that-Verify-has-
lost-its-head-will-the-corpse-be-decently-buried). 
Whitley, E. A. (1994). Too many errors on the cards, Letters to the Editor, Daily Telegraph, . 
Whitley, E. A. (2014). REF Impact Case Study: Scrapping costly and controversial proposals 
for identity cards, (available at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/researchImpact/caseStudies/whitley-
scrapping-costly-controversial-proposals-identity-cards.aspx). 
Whitley, E. A. (2015). The government’s Verify service demonstrates the benefits of 
focusing on user needs, (available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-
governments-verify-service-demonstrates-the-benefits-of-focusing-on-user-needs/). 
Whitley, E. A., and Hosein, G. (2010a). Global challenges for identity policies, Palgrave Macmillan 
Basingstoke. 
Whitley, E. A., and Hosein, G. (2010b). Opposition policies on identity cards, (available at 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/opposition-policies-on-identity-cards/). 
Whitley, E. A., and Manby, B. (2015). Questions of legal identity in the post-2015 
development agenda, (available at 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/humanrights/2015/05/28/questions-of-legal-identity-in-the-
post-2015-development-agenda/). 
Whitley, E. A., Martin, A. K., and Hosein, G. (2014). From surveillance-by-design to 
privacy-by-design: Evolving identity policy in the UK, in Histories of State Surveillance in 
Europe and Beyond K. Boersma, R. Brakel, C. Fonio, and P. Wagenaar (eds.), Routledge 
London, 205–219. 
Winner, L. (1980). Do artifacts have politics?, Daedalus 109(1), 121–36. 
Woolgar, S., and Cooper, G. (1999). Do artefacts have ambivalence? Moses’ bridges, 
Winner’s bridges and other urban legends in S&TS, Social studies of science 29(3), 433–449. 
World Bank (2017). Principles on identification for sustainable development: Toward the 
digital age, World Bank (available at 
94 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/213581486378184357/pdf/112614-WP-
PUBLIC-IDDIdentificationPrinciples.pdf). 
Zuboff, S. (2015). Big other: surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information 
civilization, Journal of Information Technology 30(1), 75–89. 
 
